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I. INTRODUCTION
Contingent fees for criminal defense attorneys-agreements
under which the attorney's fee depends upon the result obtained in
the case-are almost uniformly considered unethical and illegal.'
Yet the American Bar Association ethics ban on criminal contingent
fees 2 did not appear in its 1908 Canons of Ethics 3 and in fact was
not introduced until the Model Code in 1969.4 In 1989, the course
reversed itself with the Supreme Court's implicit approval of crimi-
nal fees paid on a defacto contingency basis. 5
This Article will explore the conventional arguments for the
ban on criminal contingent fees. In this Introduction, however, I
will suggest that the motives for the ethics prohibition derive from a
submerged, unstated source, giving a curbside psycho-legal analysis
designed not to prove but to provoke.
From Colonial times, statutes providing for counsel for indi-
gent criminal defendants have existed, but the actual historical prac-
tices of the various states cannot be considered humanitarian.6
Aside from those instances when lawyers volunteered their services,
poor criminal defendants often simply pled guilty without counsel
as a formality before being carted off to prison. One variation,
which must have looked like a reform at the time, was to assign a
lawyer present in the courtroom to make an on-the-spot consulta-
tion before the plea.7 More effective means of representation for
indigent criminal defendants, beginning with voluntary defender
and legal aid society assistance programs, and later followed by pub-
lic defender programs, were established gradually.8
Until well into this century the overall situation for criminal de-
fendants remained grim: In 1926, two-thirds of the cases in Phila-
delphia were tried without defense counsel, and as late as 1961,
nearly half the country's poor defendants were similarly
I See, e.g., People v. Winkler, 71 N.Y.2d 592, 596, 523 N.E.2d 485, 487, 528
N.Y.S.2d 360, 362 (1988) ("[w]e strongly support the unanimous view" that criminal
contingent fees should be prohibited.).
2 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(2) (1983) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES].
3 CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 13 (1908) ("Contingent fees, where sanctioned by law,
should be under the supervision of the court, in order that clients may be protected
from unjust changes.") [hereinafter CANONS].
4 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE].
5 See discussion infra Part VI.
6 WILLIAM H. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 137-38 (1955).
7 Ellery E. Cuff, Public Defender System: The Los Angeles Story, 45 MINN. L.REv. 715, 719
(1961).




While the Supreme Court recognized that criminal defendants
must be permitted to use counsel in their defense,10 the Court did
not recognize a constitutional guarantee of legal representation for
indigent defendants in federal court until 1938.11 Finally, in 1963,
in the landmark case Gideon v. Wainwright,1 2 the Court expanded this
constitutional right and required an appointed lawyer for the poor
in state prosecutions as well. This decision was part of the criminal
rights revolution of the Warren Court, a policy sweep of particular
benefit to the poor. In an earlier ruling that the Constitution re-
quired indigent defendants to be furnished a free transcript for ap-
peal, the Court's plurality gave the rallying cry: "There can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has."1' 3
Conceptual equality of the legal positions of rich and poor
criminal defendants is one thing; courtroom reality is another. The
Supreme Court did not do away with the obvious disparity: the
"amount" of justice one received. The vigorousness of the defense
if not the chances of a favorable disposition still depended in large
measure on the competence and preparation time available to one's
attorney. Most participants in the criminal court process would
agree that a criminal defendant would be far better off with an ex-
pensive private defense lawyer of sterling reputation than with an
overworked staff member of the local public defender's office or
Legal Aid Society.14 Normally, the latter kind of lawyer is simply
assigned to the indigent defendant under Gideon's command be-
cause the courts are usually not too concerned with the defendant's
wishes in this regard.1 5
As the Supreme Court has observed, "[T]here are few defend-
ants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best law-
9 Herman I. Pollock, EqualJustice in Practice, 45 MINN. L. REV. 737, 739, 749 (1961).
10 See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 308 (1930).
11 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
12 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
13 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion).
14 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 57 n.21 (1972) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that the pay and work conditions of most public defender's offices
attract legal talent of less experience than the private bar); ROBERT HERMANN, ERIC SIN-
GLE &JOHN BOSTON, COUNSEL FOR THE POOR: CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN URBAN AMERICA 20-
22 (1977) (suggesting that case loads and office structures of public defender's offices
may promote less effective representation of indigent criminal defendants than private
lawyers can provide.).
15 See Peter W. Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L.REv.
73, 73-75 (1974) (the court will defer to the wishes of an indigent defendant concerning
choice of counsel only in limited circumstances).
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yers they can get to prepare and present their defenses,"' 6 and as
the Court recently restated, "[T]he harsh reality [is] that the quality
of a criminal defendant's representation frequently may turn on his
ability to retain the best counsel money can buy."' 17 Despite the
Court's acknowledgement, this "two-track"' 8 system of criminal jus-
tice for the rich and the poor is unlikely to change. So long as the
practice of law is a private profession, it will reflect the welfare-
leavened capitalist norms of the larger society: "You get what you
(or the government) can pay for."
Fair-minded people, whatever their general view on the lot of
the poor in our society, cannot be comfortable with a criminal jus-
tice system in which the accused's money or lack thereof plays a cru-
cial role in the quality of his or her defense. I suggest that the 1969
ABA prohibition on criminal contingent fees arose from an impulse
to repress the "dirty little secret" that the chance of going to prison
or the gas chamber is dependent in significant part on one's per-
sonal wealth, something that has always been true but which became
unbearable with the Supreme Court's guarantee of counsel for the
poor. Allowing criminal contingent fees in the 1960's revolutionary
atmosphere would have emphasized the relationship of money to a
top quality defense at a time when the relevance of poverty was sup-
posedly being swept away. Contingency fees graphically tie the law-
yer's role in obtaining freedom to money, and that linkage is not
comfortably containable within the four corners of a self-imposed
code of morality that in many places reads like a paean to the nobil-
ity of lawyers. To be sure, if this scenario is correct, the code mak-
ers' embarrassment over contingent fees for the accused arose from
a sense of decency.
This Article will criticize the stated reasons for this ethical ban
and the case law making criminal contingent fee agreements unen-
forceable. It will also consider the role contingency fees could play
in modern criminal practice. I will argue that with the advent of a
1989 Supreme Court decision interpreting and upholding a statute
that virtually legalized contingent fees in an important class of crimi-
nal cases, the ethical ban on criminal contingency fees should be
repealed.
16 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
17 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989) (quoting
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J. concurring)).
18 HERMANN et al., supra note 14, at 21.
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II. THE TRADITIONAL RULE: CRIMINAL CONTINGENT FEE
AGREEMENTS ARE UNENFORCEABLE
In order to discourage undesirable conduct, courts have long
claimed the right to refuse to enforce contracts whose performance
would be illegal or against "public policy."' 9 At one time even civil
contingent fee arrangments were illegal in most states, though they
began to gain acceptance during the nineteenth century. 20 Criminal
contingency fees, in contrast, have continued to be viewed by courts
as against public policy.
F.B. MacKinnon, one of the most influential authorities on
criminal contingent fees,2 1 remarked on support for the public pol-
icy against allowing such fees:
The third area of practice [besides domestic relations and government
lobbying] in which the use of the contingent fee is generally consid-
ered to be prohibited is the prosecution and defense of criminal cases.
However, there are so few cases, and these are predominantly old, that
it is doubtful that there can be said to be any current law on the
subject.2
2
MacKinnon believed that, given such sparse case authority, one
could rely on the "consensus among commentators" for the propo-
sition that the criminal contingent fee is void as against public pol-
icy, but he did not cite any commentators. 23 Instead, MacKinnon
relied on citations to three cases.
24
In Weber v. Shay, 25 a lawyer sued on a contract to pay him for
services regarding potential charges against a client. The lawyer
had agreed to try to prevent an indictment by preparing testimony,
and to prevent disgrace of the client "as much as our influence and
power could." 26  The trial judge charged the jury that counsel
could perfectly well investigate the prosecution's witnesses and re-
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch.8, Introductory Note, at 2 (1981).
20 Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 36-37 (1989).
21 See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION sec. 3.3(e) cmt. at 209 (Tentative Draft March 1970)(The Advisory Committee
on the Prosecution and Defense Functions' ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice cites MacKinnon's work as authoritative.); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, In-
formal Op. 832 (1965) (MacKinnon "helpful," but not wholly dispositive); MODEL CODE,
supra note 4, DR 2-106(C) n.90 (1980)(MacKinnon's work "guided" ABA policy); F.B.
MAcKINNON, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A
STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1964).
22 See MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 52 (citations omitted).
23 Id. See also, id. at n.94 (citing only a proposed rule for the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts).
24 See discussion infra at notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
25 46 N.E. 377 (Ohio 1897).
26 Id. at 378.
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port to the prosecutor their bad character or motives. 27 The Ohio
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract was void as
against public policy because it promoted counsel's improper use of
influence on the grand jury to impede justice.28 The trial court's
jury instructions, which would have barred recovery only upon
proof of actual obstruction ofjustice, were considered too lenient.2 9
Instead, the Ohio high court presumed that the contract en-
couraged "secret and corrupt practices," and it considered proof of
improper conduct immaterial because of the "corrupting tendency"
of the agreement. 30 Weber, then, lends little support to MacKinnon's
general proposition because the case was decided on policy grounds
not directly related to the propriety of criminal contingency fees
themselves.
MacKinnon next cited Peyton v. Margiotti,3 1 a case in which the
plaintiff's lawyer had agreed to attempt, on a contingent basis, to
get a convicted murderer pardoned. The court held that the con-
tract was against public policy, reasoning that contingent fee rules
are stricter in criminal than in civil practice "because of the danger
of corrupting justice."3 2 As authority, the court cited Hatzfield v.
Gulden,33 which had held that all monetary contracts to obtain a par-
don are void even if the money is for an attorney's fee, whether fixed
or contingent3 4 . The Hatzfield court, as did the court in Weber v.
Shay, concluded that in certain matters the charging of any fees for
services rendered by criminal law practitioners would be against
public policy.35 Hatzfield was not decided upon the use of contin-
gent fees per se,36 and the case was cited by the Peyton court only for
the broad proposition that bargains to secure pardons are illegal.3 7
Thus, Peyton's statements about contingent fees were superfluous.3
8
27 Id. at 379.
28 Id. at 380.
29 Id. at 378-80.
30 Id. at 380.
31 156 A.2d 865 (Pa. 1959).
32 Id. at 867.
33 7 Watts 152 (Pa. 1838), cited in Peyton, 156 A.2d at 867.
34 Hatzfield, 7 Watts at 155.
35 Id. at 154.
36 Id. at 153 ("remuneration for his services and loss of time"). While the lawyer had
made a separate agreement with the trustees of the prisoner's property which paid him
part of his fee on a contingency basis, that agreement was not at issue in the case. Id. at
153-55.
37 Peyton, 156 A.2d at 867.
38 The Pton court cited other cases relating to lawyer's fees and ethics, but these
cases fail to add support to the proposition that the court opposed the use of contingent
fees themselves in criminal cases. See id. (quoting Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts &
Serg. 315, 321 (Pa. 1843)) (prohibiting contracts "to procure or endeavor to procure the
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Two of the seven justices in Peyton concurred on other grounds.
They stated that the contingent fee is "a necessity for a poor
man.... In many civil and criminal cases a poor person is unable to
engage [his choice of] lawyer except on the basis of a contingent fee.
Provided such a fee is fair and reasonable," the concurring justices
stated, the contract should be upheld.39
The third case cited by MacKinnon, Baca v. Padilla,40 concerned
an agreement to assist a prosecutor; the arrangement provided for a
reasonable fee in the event of the accused's acquittal, but it pro-
vided a larger fee in the event of a conviction. The court reasoned
that since the state is presumed to have the resources to prosecute a
case, there is no need to attract private attorneys by means of con-
tingent fees to assist in prosecution.4' Furthermore, an assistant
working on a contingent fee would have an interest in the outcome
of the case and might seek a conviction regardless of innocence, and
prosecutors should not be interested in outcomes, only injustice.
42
Baca stands only for the proposition that a contingency fee is
improper for prosecutors. MacKinnon overlooked this distinction.
Prosecutors and defense counsel have widely differing duties. As
the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice state, "The duty of a prose-
cutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.... The basic duty the
lawyer for the accused owes to the administration of justice is to
serve as the accused's counselor and advocate .... ,,43 Moreover, a
contingent fee could color the exercise of a prosecutor's discretion,
but a defense counsel has no comparable discretionary power.
MacKinnon's discussion of the meager case law trailed off in a
tone of "it doesn't matter anyway," noting that contingent fees as a
practical matter are unlikely in criminal cases and that the trend was
passage of an Act by the Legislature"); Peyton, 156 A.2d at 867 (quoting Bowman v.
Coffroth, 50 Pa. (9 Smith) 19, 23 (1868)) (prohibiting contracts to procure official ap-
pointments or "right[s] of administration").
39 Peyton, 156 A.2d at 870 (Bell, J., concurring) (reasoning that by requiring disclo-
sure of an attorney's fee, the Pardon Board could prevent fees which it believed might
promote a lawyer's improper use of influence with the Board).
40 190 P. 730 (N.M. 1920).
41 Id. at 732. Accord, Price v. Caperton, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 207, 208 (1864) (prohibiting
contingency fees for assisting in prosecution, and finding little need for any compensa-
tion as providing assistance to the government would be an attorney's "privilege" and
"civic duty"). But cf. People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347, 351-52 (Cal.
1985) (reasoning that the use of a contingent fee is improper in such a case on the
grounds that it taints the government's neutral pursuit ofjustice; approving, however, of
the state's use of private counsel under appropriate fee arrangements), cert. denied sub
nom., City of Corona v. Superior Court, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986).
42 Baca, 190 P. at 731-32.
43 1 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE 3-1.1(c), 3.7 cmt., 4-1.1(b) (2d ed. 1980)(here-
inafter ABA STANDARDS); see also, MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at Rule 3.8.
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toward public funding of criminal defense fees.44
Other cases that discuss the enforceability of criminal contin-
gent fee arrangements reflect the distrust of criminal attorneys evi-
dent in Weber and Peyton. In Ormerod v. Dearman,45 the client agreed
that if the attorney got a fornication prosecution settled and with-
drawn by the husband he would be paid $2,000.46 Via the lawyer,
the defendant settled with the husband, and the prosecutor appar-
ently withdrew the action.
47
The Ormerod court said the contract with the attorney was to
prevent a case from coming to court, and that one cannot contract
to stifle a prosecution for a fee, even for a misdeameanor in the con-
trol of the parties. 48 Allowing such an arrangement, the court
noted, would lower the standards and impair the "dignity and use-
fulness" of the legal profession. 49 To the court, the contract im-
plied an understanding to use unprofessional means in resolving the
lawsuit.50 Although the court disapproved of the contract, its deci-
sion did not turn on the contingent nature of the fee, but on the
substance of the contract: The principle was that "contracts which
have for their subject-matter any interference with the creation of
laws or their due enforcement are against public policy and there-
fore void." 5 1 The Ormerod court analogized the matter to offers to
obtain a pardon for money:52 "[W]e do not wish to see advertise-
ments that pardons will be obtained at the lowest price, nor any-
thing which approaches to it. . . ."53 The court concluded with a
flourish typical of the time: "The law guards with jealousy every
avenue to its courts of justice, and strikes down everything in the
shape of a contract which may afford a temptation to interfere with
its due administration." 54
In these days of overcrowded criminal courts Ormerod's premise
is unappealing. An assault complainant's wish that the charge be
withdrawn is a valid reason for the prosecutor not to prosecute, 55
and in Ormerod the complainant voluntarily agreed not to pursue the
44 See MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 52-53.
45 100 Pa. (4 Outerbridge) 561 (1882).





51 Id. at 564.
52 Id. at 563-64.
53 Id. at 564 (quoting Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts 152, 155 (Pa. 1838)). See also,
supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
54 Ormerod, 100 Pa. (4 Outerbridge) at 564.
55 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a) (1984).
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action further.5 6 Viewing private attempts to settle relatively minor
criminal disputes as improper seems very odd in our present world
of clogged dockets.
57
By the second half of this century, citation to codified, widely
accepted authority was sufficient to hold criminal contingency fee
agreements "void as against public policy."58 In fact, it was consid-
ered defamatory even to accuse an attorney of having entered into
such an arrangement. 59
While most courts viewed criminal contingent fees with ex-
treme disfavor, the Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts actu-
ally upheld a complaint brought to enforce a criminal contingent fee
agreement. In O'Donnell v. Bane,60 the court reviewed an attorney's
complaint against his former client for failure to perform his part of
a contingent fee agreement after the client's acquittal on criminal
charges. 61 At trial, the defendant had moved for a directed verdict
on the basis that the criminal contingent fee arrangement violated a
court rule, and he requested jury instructions to that effect. 62 The
Massachusetts high court, however, ruled that the defendant's an-
swer to the complaint failed to preserve the defense of "unenforce-
ability or illegality" as against public policy because this issue had
not been properly pleaded. 63 The court stated that it would over-
look a defendant's failure to plead this defense "only where the evi-
dence shows a contract which is inherently wrongful or which is
violative of some fundamental principle of public policy." 64 Despite
plaintiff's testimony which indicated a possible contingent fee ar-
56 Ormerod, 100 Pa. (4 Outerbridge) at 563.
57 In fact, considerable effort has recently been spent in extending alternative means
of dispute resolution movement, so that they may encompass many instances where the
criminal charge is a lesser offense. See, e.g. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET. AL., DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION 12 (1985).
58 Genins v. Geiger, 240 S.E.2d 745, 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (citing RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CoNTRAcTS sec. 542(2) (1932)); see also, MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR 2-
106(c). The plaintiff in Genins attempted to pursue these claims again, but the original
holding against the use of contingency fees in certain matters was upheld. See, Genins v.
Geiger, 254 S.E.2d 913, 913-14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979).
59 See McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ky.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982) (holding that allegations in news reports that an
attorney required a criminal defendant to pay a contingency fee, along with reports of
the attorney's plan to "fix" a case, were defamatory as a matter of law if published when
known to be false). See also, Steere v. Cupp, 602 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Kan. 1979). In Steere,
the court ultimately ruled against the plaintiff, however, because it found the reported
use of contingency fees by the lawyer "substantially true." Id. at 1274.
60 431 N.E.2d 190 (Mass. 1982).
61 Id. at 191.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 192.
64 Id. (quoting Gleason v. Mann, 45 N.E.2d 280, 282 (Mass. 1942)).
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rangement, and despite the court's recognition of public policy
against criminal contingent fees, the court found that while the evi-
dence was sufficient to "warrant" a finding of a contingent fee
agreement, the evidence did not "compel" such a finding.65 By al-
lowing procedural rules to prevent it from striking down an appar-
ent criminal contingency fee agreement, the O'Donnell court casts
doubt on the strength of public policy against such practices.
Prior to 1981, the case law66 developed against the prestigious
backdrop of the Restatement (First) of Contracts (1932), which ex-
plicitly stated that an agreement to conduct a criminal case for a
contingent fee was illegal.67 Pulling no punches, the Restatement
lumped criminal contingent fees in its subdivision on "Bargains
Tending To Obstruct the Administration of Justice"6 8 along with
such disreputable strategies as bargains to suppress evidence 69 and
agreements to enforce unfounded claims.70 When the American
Law Institute adopted this prohibition there was no discussion on
the floor.
7 1
Subsequent authorities have similarly ignored or dismissed
criminal contingency fees without thorough examination. The Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts does not deal with contingent fees
and their ilk because "the subjects are so largely governed by legis-
lation."'72 Corbin, for his part, agreed without analysis that criminal
contingent fees were illegal, but he cited only divorce cases. 73 Wil-
liston similarly discussed only divorce cases, and did not mention a
rule for criminal defense cases. 7
4
An ALI Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers which is
now in progress will likely continue, as a matter of black-letter law,
the ban on criminal contingent fees. 75 The original commentary
65 Id. at 191, 193-94.
66 See Genins v. Geiger, 240 S.E.2d 745, 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); Peyton v. Margi-
otta, 156 A.2d 865, 867 (Pa. 1959).
67 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS sec. 542(2) (student ed. 1933).
68 Id.
69 Id. at § 554.
70 Id. at § 555.
71 See William E. Mikell, Discussion of the Administration of the Criminal Law, 10 A.L.I.
PROC. 101, 165 (Tentative Draft No. 2 1932). But cf, id. at 167 (discussing briefly the
lack of state criminal statutes against champerty).
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch.8, Reporter's Note to Introductory
Note at 4 (1981).
73 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1424 (Ist ed. 1962).
74 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1285A at pp.933-34
(Walter H.E. Jaeger, ed., 3d ed. 1967). See also, id. at § 1716 (4th ed. 1972) (discussing
the prohibition for contingent fees in criminal prosecutions.).
75 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS sec. 47 and cmts.
(Tentative Draft No.4, April 10, 1991) [hereinafter LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS].
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recognizes, however, that the reasons for the traditional ban are "on
balance unpersuasive. ' ' 76 It finds the best rationale for the ban to be
the lack of necessity for a contingent fee arrangement, because win-
ning a criminal case does not increase the client's assets. 77 The
commentary notes the immorality-of-the bar argument, and contin-
gent fee discouragement of plea bargaining.78 It points out
problems in drafting a criminal contingent fee agreement, such as
defining the outcome determining the size of the fee, ensuring that
the fee will be paid, and explaining the complexities of the agree-
ment to the client.79 The commentary adds that many lawyers
might be unwilling to risk contingent non-payment and continue to
demand advance payment. Why this would be a reason for prohibit-
ing lawyers from making this risk assessment themselves is not
stated.
After noting that, on the contrary, contingent fees might well
promote effective assistance of counsel, the ALI commentary states
"[ilt is desirable, on balance, that the law be changed so that clients
who would find a contingent-fee arrangement agreement preferable
to a flat fee would be permitted to exercise that preference."80 This
conclusion casts the contrary black-letter rule of the proposed as
truly a "restatement," and not a forward-looking proposal.8'
In a wave of distrust and misunderstanding, courts and com-
mentators have summarily swept criminal contingent fees away with-
out argument. The opinions do not seem informed by advocacy in
favor of contingent fees and present no thorough analysis of the
purported flaws of such fees other then gloomy forebodings about
imagined sinister influences. The early opinions exhibit a general
distrust of the criminal defense function and a distaste of what crim-
inal defense lawyers do. F.B. MacKinnon's report on contingent
fees-apparently the only one published at the time-characterized
the criminal cases as old and few in number, yet his uncritical syn-
thesis of the sparse caselaw gave it the status of iron authority.
Within this uncritical context, the American Bar Association was
getting ready to put its own imprimatur on the criminal contingent
fee ban.
76 Id. This commentary was rejected by the ALl membership at the 1991 Annual
Meeting, according to the author's conversation with a Reporter for the Restatement.
77 Id. at comment c(i). See also discussion infra part IV.D.i.
78 Id. § 47 and cmts.; see discussion infra part IV.B.ii, IV.C.
79 Il, § 47 and cmts.; but see discussion infra part V. (discussing proposed model con-
tingency fee agreements).
80 Idt, § 47 and cmts.
81 But see supra note 76.
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III. THE RECENT VIEW: CRIMINAL CONTINGENT FEES
ARE UNETHICAL
A few years before the ABA promulgated its first ethics code,
8 2
a judge cautiously approved criminal contingent fees:
In criminal cases the objections to conditional fees are much more se-
rious than in cases involving only questions relating to property; so
serious indeed that it is probably best never to make any such contract
with persons charged with crime. If made, the contract should relate
and be expressly confined to services rendered on or in connection
with the trial.
8 3
This hedged approval of criminal contingent fees was repli-
cated by early ABA statements of policy.8 4 When the ABA adopted
the Canons of Ethics in 1908, the delegates devoted much more de-
bate to proposed Canon 13 permitting contingent fees than to any
other provision.8 5 Yet nothing was said on the floor about criminal
contingent fees.86 Canon 13 deemed contingent fees ethical "where
sanctioned by law", requiring that they should be reasonable and
subject to the supervision of the court to avoid unjust charges.8 7 By
failing to use the terms "civil" or "criminal" this Canon literally
made criminal contingent fees not unethical per se, and so ethics
opinions upheld such arrangements.88 One ABA opinion stated in
82 The ABA's original CANONS OF ETmICS, adopted in 1908, relied extensively on a
compilation of various ethics codes already adopted by many states, as well as on the
works of George Sharswood and David Hoffman. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 23-
24 (1953). Neither the nation's first code of ethics, Alabama Code of 1887, nor the
works of Sharswood and Hoffman, made specific reference to criminal contingency fees.
See CODE OF ETHICS ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION Rule 51 (1887)(amended 1899)
reprinted in HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS, supra at 362; GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COM-
PEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUIrEs OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW, DELIVERED
BEFORE THE LAW CLASS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (1854), reprinted in GEORGE
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 158-69 (3d ed. 1869); DAVID HOFFMAN,
A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY Division IX, Resolution XXIV (2d ed. 1836).
83 HENRY W. WILLIAMS, LEGAL ETHICS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR YOUNG COUNSEL 70
(1906).
84 See CANONS, supra note 3, at Canon 13 ("Contingent fees, where sanctioned by
law .... ).
85 See 33 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 55-86 (1908); see also, DRINKER,
supra note 82, at 24 & n.17 (describing how Canon 13 was the only one of thirty-two
canons proposed but not adopted in its original form. It was later amended and passed
after considerable debate.).
86 See 33 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 61-85 (1908).
87 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. The 1933 amendment to Canon 13
reemphasized the role of judicial supervision over contingency fee arrangements, but
such nominal supervision did little to restrict the growing use of contingency contracts
by lawyers. See, 58 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 152, 157-61 (1933).
88 See, e.g., North Carolina State Bar, Formal Op. 68 (1951) reported in OLAvI MARU,
DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS Op. 3092 (1970); North Carolina State
Bar Formal Op. 359 (1961) reported in MARU, supra, at Op. 3383; Philadelphia Bar Associ-
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full: "Canon 13 applies to criminal cases. Irrespective of agree-
ments, the lawyer should always be willing to have the court pass on
the reasonableness of his charges under the various contingencies
specified and should make such charges so reasonable that, if sub-
mitted to the court, it would sustain him."89 A subsequent opinion
reinforced the premise that criminal contingent fees were not always
unethical by noting that the matter depended in part on legality. 90
If the ethics of the matter depended upon whether the fee was legal
in the local jurisdiction, then dearly criminal contingent fees were
not deemed unethical per se.
When the ABA adopted its superseding Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility in 1969, however, criminal contingent fees
were explicitly made unethical per se.91 The Code provided that
"[a] lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or col-
lect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal
case."' 92 The Model Code did, however, allow for some civil contin-
gency arrangements, which it justified on the basis that the relief
awarded in civil cases produced a "res out of which the fee can be
paid."93 "Public policy properly condemns contingent fee arrange-
ments in criminal cases, largely on the ground that legal services in
criminal cases do not produce a res with which to pay the fee." 94
The Code cited and quoted Peyton v. Margiotti95 and the MacKinnon
ation Comm. on Professional Guidance, Formal Op. 58-2 (1958) reported in MARu, supra,
at Op. 4016 (1970); Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 88
(1959) reported in MARU, supra, at Op. 4457; Chicago Bar Assoc. Comm. on Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-9 (1985) reported in 1 NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL ETH-
ICS AND RESPONSIBILITY IL:Opinions:25-26 (1985). Contra, Arizona State Bar Assoc.,
Formal Op. 168 (1965) reported in MAXu, supra at Op. 5913 (1972 Supp.).
89 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 337 (1967),
reported in OLAWi MARu, 1970 SUPPLEMENT TO THE DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETics
OPINIONS Op. 5045 (1972).
90 ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Decision 832
(1965).
91 See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR 2-106(C) (1980). The proposed code had been
thoroughly studied by state and local bar associations, so it is not surprising that the very
limited floor debate in the ABA House of Delegates did not mention contingent fees.
See 94 ABA REP. 382-92 (1969). The other ABA prohibition of contingency fees, in
domestic relations cases, did not appear in the MODEL CODE and was not adopted until
its inclusion in the MODEL RULES. See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.5(d)(1).
92 MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR 2-106(C) (citation omitted).
93 Id. at EC 2-20.
94 Id. The prohibition on contingency fees did not exclude consideration of the
case's outcome at all in civil cases: A New York State Bar Association opinion held that
while criminal contingent fees are prohibited, civil contingent fees may be based partly
on the results of the case-within the restrictions of the MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR
2-106(B)(4). New York State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 412
(1975), reported in MARU, supra note 88, at Op. 9172 (1977).
95 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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monograph.96
While most states adopted the ABA's prohibition,97 they en-
forced it with a mere "slap on the wrist" if the only alleged infrac-
tion was charging a criminal contingent fee.
98
In 1983 the ABA superseded the Model Code with its Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. The proposed draft by its Commis-
sion on Evaluation of Professional Standards did not include a pro-
hibition of criminal contingent fees, but allowed the matter to turn
on the law of each state.99 The ABA House of Delegates, however,
adopted an explicit ban on criminal contingent fees °00 without de-
bate, via an amendment drafted by the International Association of
Insurance Counsel (a state bar association had also proposed a
ban).10' The Model Rules have been adopted by a majority of
states. 102
The ABA also speaks to criminal defense ethics through its in-
fluential Standards for Criminal Justice, 10 3 which is intended to pro-
vide both guidance and authority to the bench as well as the bar.10 4
Standard 4-3.3 states that it is unprofessional to have a contingent
fee arrangement. The commentary notes that such fees have long
been forbidden and repeats the rationales of the ethics codes while
hearkening back to another era in language reminiscent of the old
96 See MACKINNON, supra note 21 et. seq. and accompanying text.
97 See M.L. PROCTOR & ROBIN ALEXANDER-SMITH, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY BY STATES vi (1980) (table showing that only fourteen states adopted rules on
contingency fees which differed from the ABA MODEL CODE DR 2-106.).
98 See, e.g., In re Steeve, 536 P.2d 54 (Kan. 1975) (public censure to be published in
the official state reporter); In re Fasig, 444 N.E.2d 849 (Ind. 1983) (public reprimand
and court costs); In Matter of Stivers, 516 N.E.2d 1066 (Ind. 1987) (reprimand and
court costs); but cf. State v. Hilton, 538 P.2d 977, 983 (Kan. 1975) (censure despite lack
of evidence of a contingency agreement; the court held that a demand for an additional
fee during a critical stage of criminal proceedings violated the spirit of the MODEL
CODE'S prohibition on criminal contingent fees). See also, Office of Disciplinary Counsel
v. Zauderer, 461 N.E.2d 883, 887 (Ohio 1984), aff'd in part and reversed in part on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 626, 654-5 (1985).
99 MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.5(c) notes on Legal Background at 36 (Pro-
posed Final Draft 1981).
100 MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.5(d)(2).
101 See 107 ABA REPORTS 622 (1982).
102 See ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:3-01:4 (American
Bar Association and Bureau of National Affairs 1990) [hereinafter ABA/BNA MANUAL].
103 The standards have been cited by courts thousands of times. See, SHEPARD'S CRIM-
INALJUSTICE CITATIONS (October 1991) (reporting over 60 pages of citations to the stan-
dards). But see, North Carolina State Bar Formal Op. 728 (1970) (explicitly rejecting the
ABA STANDARDS and permitting criminal contingent fees), reported in MARU, supra note
88, at Op. 9478 (1975 Supplement). The North Carolina Bar later reversed itself. See,
North Carolina State Bar, Formal Op. 843 (1973), reported in MARU, supra note 88, at Op.
9594.
104 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, at xix-xx.
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cases, stating that a contingent arrangement may "tempt the advo-
cate to employ improper or corrupt tactics to enhance the fee."'
0 5
While civil contingent fees are necessary lest a large part of the pub-
lic be denied the opportunity to litigate, "[in the administration of
criminal justice the stakes are high, and thus the danger of abuse
resulting from a contingent fee is especially great."' 106 The com-
mentary concludes that there is no problem of lack of legal repre-
sentation because of the constitutional right to counsel.
In contrast to the ABA, the American Trial Lawyers' Associa-
tion permits criminal contingent fees in its code of ethics.' 07 The
Association argues that there is even more reason to allow a contin-
gent fee in criminal cases than in civil cases, because the criminal
loser goes to prison and is thus less able to pay than if he had been
acquitted. Moreover, the Trial Lawyers' Association asserts, a law-
yer will work on a contingency only if the defense seems strong.'0 8
Unscrupulous lawyers would be no more likely to fabricate a de-
fense on a contingency than if they were on a straight retainer fee
agreement. 10 9 In sharp contrast to the ABA models, the Trial Law-
yer's Association code has not been adopted by any jurisdiction. 110
The ABA did not focus on criminal contingent fees when it
adopted the permissive 1909 Canon, probably because of the rela-
tive unimportance of the issue. By the time it adopted the Model
Code in the late 1960's, MacKinnon's monograph had been en-
shrined as the authoritative study of contingent fees, and the ABA
uncritically adopted his conclusions in partial justification for its eth-
ics ban. The Model Rules of the early 1980's have likewise perpetu-
ated the ban on criminal contingency fees without any subsequent
critical analysis.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE BAN ON CRIMINAL CONTINGENT FEES
Freedom to contract is still somewhat of a presumption in the
105 Id. at4.37,supra note 43, at 4.37 n.10 (citing MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 52). See
MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR 2-106(C); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, at 4.11S (1986
Supp.) (citing MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.5(d)).
106 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, at 4-3.3.
107 THE AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Rule 5.6(d) (1982) [hereinafter
TRIAL LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT].
108 Id.
109 Id. at cmt.
10 See John W. Hall, Contingent Fees in Criminal Cases: Has the Supreme Court Sanctioned
Them?, THE CHAMPION (NACDL) 20 (Dec. 1990). The National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers (NACDL) considered deeming contingent fees ethical in the wake of
Supreme Court decisions (discussed in the last part of this Article), but gave up the




law, and a contingent fee agreement is a contract."' A fair starting
point for evaluation of a prohibition of contract is to put the burden
of proof on those who would infringe upon contractual freedom and
thus interfere with individual liberty and market mechanisms.
A. HOW CRIMINAL LAWYERS SET FEES
Evaluation of ethics rules requires examination of existing prac-
tices. Fee-setting by criminal lawyers must be viewed through the
distorting prism of the criminal lawyer's fundamental remuneration
problem: getting paid. Criminal lawyers are more concerned than
other lawyers with collection of the fee-after all, their clients are
mostly criminals. 12 However easily a criminal lawyer might eventu-
ally reduce a client's obligation to a judgment, an agreed-upon fee
that is not collected is no fee at all.
As a practical matter, the lawyer's fee in a criminal case is gen-
erally a flat fee paid in advance. A leading statement on the subject
advises setting a single fixed fee if possible, avoiding hourly or
"stairstep" rates." 13 Criminal clients are not inclined to pay after a
losing trial, and an acquittal, known to them as "justice," is not
something for which they often feel obligated to pay." 14 Total fee-
grabbing at the earliest moment is further raised to a feverish pitch
by the reluctance of many courts to let defense attorneys withdraw
simply because they have not been paid. 1 5 Attorneys are advised,
then, to collect "while the tears are flowing."116
One noted practitioner has stated that most serious cases are,
as a practical matter, on a contingency fee because few lawyers get
their full fee up front, some installments are not due until after trial,
and if the client is imprisoned, he is unlikely to pay. 1 7 Even on the
dubious assumption that were the client not imprisoned he would
pay the balance, this practitioner is probably over-generalizing.
Criminal lawyers who work with white collar clients and other de-
fendants from the higher economic and social strata have several
ways of looking forward to getting most or all of their fee by the
1 11 JOHN D. CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 1-3 (3d ed. 1987).
1 12 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, How TO SET AND COLLECT ATrORNEY FEES IN CRIMI-
NAL CASES passim (1985) [hereinafter How TO SET FEES].
113 Lionel R. Barrett, The Ten Commandments of Setting and Collecting Attorneys Fees in Crim-
inal Cases, THE CHAMPION (NACDL) 3 (Aug. 1983).
114 JOHN W. HALL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER 149
(1987).
115 How TO SET FEES, supra note 112, at 9, 25.
116 HALL, supra note 114, at 159.




time of verdict. These methods include working on a full retainer,
or on partial retainer plus either an hourly fee (if and when the re-
tainer is exhausted) or on a series of sub-retainers ("stairsteps") as
the prosecution survives various hurdles, such as grand jury presen-
tation, motion to suppress evidence, and plea-bargaining)'18
Clientele from the lower economic strata are asked to protect
their lawyers with a retainer paid up-front to cover the entire prose-
cution.119 Necessity is the mother of ingenuity for the criminal prac-
titioner, who might first silently determine his fee, then quote the
client a fee twice as large, and request that he get paid "one-half"
up-front.' 20 Notwithstanding Professor Brickman's recent forceful
argument that nonrefundable retainers are illegal and unethical as
in conflict with the client's right to discharge his lawyer,' 2 '
nonrefundable retainers are used much of the time and can be sub-
stantial.122 In fact, a minimum fee agreement is recommended in an
ABA publication, which sees hourly rates as unfair to "experienced
lawyers [who] often resolve cases quickly and satisfactorily with only
a modest investment of time."'
23
B. CONFLICT OF INTEREST RATIONALES FOR THE PROHIBITION
The strongest reason given for the ban on criminal contingent
fees, albeit one not offered by the ABA, 124 is that they lead to con-
flicts of interest between attorney and client. It is helpful in evaluat-
ing this rationale to first focus on what exactly a conflict of interest
is, and how this definition relates to criminal representation.
i. Conflict of Interest: A Definition
Under the ABA's Model Rules, lawyers may not represent cli-
ents if representation may be "materially" limited by the lawyer's
own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representa-
tion will not in fact be adversely affected, and the client consents
after being fully informed of the circumstances and his or her op-
118 How TO SET FEES, supra note 112, passim.
119 Id. at 4; see also, Barry Tarlow, Fee Forfeiture: Apocalypse Now or Business as Usual?, 26
TRIAL 45, 46 (April 1990).
120 How TO SET FEES, supra note 112, at 21.
121 Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible
under Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM. L.REv. 149 (1988).
122 Tarlow, supra note 119, at 46.
123 How TO SET FEES, supra note 112, at 8.
124 See, MODEL CODE, supra note 4, EC 2-20; id. at DR 2-106; MODEL RULES, supra note
2, Rule 1.5, cmt. The ABA STANDARDS refer to the principle that the lawyer should not
have a pecuniary interest in the litigation in the context of corruption, not conflict of
interest. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, 4-3.3 cmt.
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tions. 125 The ABA says the "critical questions" include the likeli-
hood that a conflict of interest will occur.1 26
An American Law Institute Restatement, currently being devel-
oped, states that there is no conflict of interest unless there is a
"substantial risk" of material, adverse effect upon the representa-
tion, meaning a significant and plausible, even if not probable,
risk.127 The ALI standard is to be applied objectively, from the per-
spective of an informed outside observer who is not dependent on
testimony about the subjective opinion of the lawyer involved.' 28
Absent consent by the client, the lawyer cannot take on a client
if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's financial interests will
materially and adversely affect representation. 129 Informed consent
by a client removes the conflict' 30 unless, inter alia, "[s]pecial cir-
cumstances render it unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide
adequate representation . .. ."131
While the ABA treats the probability of conflict as a factor rele-
vant to whether the lawyer's representation is precluded, the Re-
statement, as just stated, defines "substantial risk" of adverse affect
as an element in itself of conflict of interest; 13 2 this may be a formal
difference only. Both treatments allow conflict-ridden representa-
tion to continue under some circumstances if the client knowledge-
ably consents. 133 Although a confict from the fee could therefore
be disregarded because of the client's consent, it hardly seems fruit-
ful to imagine whether a client could be knowledgable enough to
give informed consent to a contingent or any other fee. Besides,
even informed consent does not remove the conflict in ALI "special
circumstances," so a claimed informed consent would only push the
issue forward to whether criminal contingent fees are "special cir-
cumstances render[ing] it unlikely that the lawyer will be able to
provide adequate representation....
Both the ABA Rules and the current ALI draft fail to ask the
one really important question: How much more likely is a contin-
125 MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7(b).
126 Id. at Rule 1.7 cmt.
127 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS sec. 201, cmt. c(iii) (Tent.
Draft No. 4, April 10, 1991). See also, id. at § 210.
128 Id. at § 201, cmt. c(iv). The RESTATEMENT would reject the appearance of impro-
priety standard on the ground that that standard prohibits representations that might
appear improper to an uninformed observer but which actually are not. Id.
129 Id. at § 206; see also, id. at § 210.
130 Id. at § 202(1).
131 Id. at § 202(2)(c).
132 Id. at § 206.
133 Id. at § 202(1).
134 Id. at § 202(2)(c).
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gent fee to be detrimental to a client's representation than other fee
arrangements? All fee arrangements create an attorney-client con-
flict.13 5 Why single out criminal contingent fees for prohibition?
ii. Conflicts Arising from Attorney's Incentive to Obtain Acquittal
The danger of conflict of interest from a criminal contingent fee
arises from the incentive for the attorney to obtain an acquittal to
collect his fee. This incentive arguably conflicts with the client's in-
terest in obtaining a plea bargain, or, if the case goes to trial, in the
client's interest in instructions giving the jury the option of re-
turning a verdict of guilty of a lesser offense than that charged in the
indictment.136 A plea bargain is an agreement between the defense
and the prosecutor to plead guilty in exchange for a consideration
from the prosecutor or judge; the bargain exchanges the defend-
ant's plea of guilty and waiver of trial for the dismissal of other, usu-
ally higher, charges, and sometimes a cap on the possible sentence.
The lesser included offense issue arises when the jury is instructed
at the end of the trial; the court determines whether to give the jury
the option of considering whether the defendant is guilty of crimes
lower than those charged in the indictment, such as manslaughter in
a murder case. Instruction of lesser included offenses tends to in-
crease the chance that the defendant will neither be convicted of the
most serious charge nor acquitted in toto; plea bargains, of course,
preclude acquittal or dismissal of all charges.
The criminal trial is riddled with uncertainty, but it is not a pure
gamble, and a reasonable client will rely enormously on his attor-
ney's advice as to whether to plea bargain or, if going to trial, to
seek an instruction on a lesser-included offense.13 7 The danger of
the 'attorney's advice being even unwittingly colored by his or her
pecuniary interest in acquittal, seems, at first, clear. Arguably, the
general ethical prohibition against conflict of interest encompasses
any contingent fee problems,1 38 but the law in general relies upon
specific per se rules, such as the ban on criminal contingent fees, to
avoid questions of applicability of general rules, such as conflict of
interest principles.
A closer look at these conflicts makes the need for a specific ban
on criminal contingent fees dubious. Plea bargaining could be hurt
135 See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 48-49 (1989) and authorities cited.
136 HALL, supra note 114, at 156.
137 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, 4-5.1 at 4.63-.65.
138 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HAND-
BOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT § 1.7:101 (2d ed. 1988).
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by a conflict of interest because the contingent attorney might avoid
it against the client's interest in his desire to earn his fee through
acquittal. But this seems a slight concern in comparison with the
conflict that plea bargaining raises with lawyers who have already
been paid their entire fee and might advise a poor bargain to be
over and done with the case, or with those lawyers who work on an
hourly fee and thus would be against even a sound bargain, to keep
the meter running. As the New York Court of Appeals has recog-
nized, there is a distinct danger that lawyers who have been paid will
be inclined against going to trial, while those who are still earning
their pay will be inclined to increase their fee by going to trial, re-
gardless of the client's interests. 139 Criminal contingent fees thus
do not seem to raise any conflicts of interest not raised by plea bar-
gaining within the context of current criminal fee practices.
As for lesser included offense instructions, by the time the attorney
must decide whether to request these he will have concluded almost
all of the trial. The work will have been done, and the receipt of a
contingent fee will depend on a verdict of acquittal. The temptation
to gamble with the client's fate seems quite large in the abstract.
Against this conflict is a counterweight discussed below; the criminal
lawyer's own interest in success. 140 A lawyer prone to the contin-
gent conflict is the kind who might be tempted toward acquittal any-
way by the promise of fame and glory; he or she is a danger
regardless of the contingent fee. Moreover, a conflict arising from
lesser included offense instructions would be highly visible and so
remediable. Lesser included offense instructions can be given only
if on a rational view of the evidence the jury could acquit of the "top
count" of the indictment and still convict on a lesser, included of-
fense. If this view of the facts is possible, the court has discretion to
give the instruction on its own motion, and must give the instruction
if the defense so requests. 141
The harm from a conflict would be the failure of the defense to
request the lesser included offense instruction, or even more notice-
ably, to object to an instruction proposed by the court, but in these
events the court could inquire as to the fee arrangement, which is
not encompassed within the attorney-client privilege. 142 A judicial
139 People v. Winkler, 71 N.Y.2d 592, 596, 523 N.E.2d 485, 487, 528 N.Y.S.2d 360,
362 (1988).
140 See, infra, section IV.B.vi.
141 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw sec. 300.50(1) (McKinney's 1982); 2 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 498 at p. 800 (2d ed. 1982); IV WHAR-
TON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 545 (Torcia ed. 12th ed. 1976).
142 24 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 5484 at 370 (1986). There are few, if any, reported cases where such an objec-
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finding that a contingent fee was the probable cause of the opposi-
tion could result in the instruction being given despite objection or
failure to request. However, the impact of the conflict would argua-
bly remain through the lack of defense advocacy for the instruction
in those close cases where the court has not suggested an instruc-
tion on its own motion.
143
Conflict arising out of a supposed economic-based drive toward
acquittal has been raised in cases in which convicted defendants
claimed they were deprived of the effective assistance of counsel be-
cause of contingent fee arrangements.' 44 The courts have given lip
service to the conflict theory but have refused to vacate convictions;
they demand proof, even in death sentence cases, 145 that the contin-
gent fee arrangement led to ineffectiveness.' 46
This approach is largely dictated by a Supreme Court general
ruling on handling conflict of interest-ineffective assistance
claims.14
7
A fuller explanation for not finding ineffective assistance of
counsel from a contingent fee violation was recently given by the
New York Court of Appeals. The court saw per se vacating of a
conviction as a disproportionate penalty for the public and a wind-
fall to the defendant arising from a situation that is hidden (fee-set-
ting) and therefore one against which the state cannot protect
itself.148 Giving relief to the defendant, the court argued, would
arm him and his unscrupulous lawyer with a delayed-trigger weapon
to be sprung if the case developed badly.
149
tion was made, although the lack of cases could indicate, implausibly, that such
objections have not in the past been overruled. See, 12A WEST'S N.Y.DIGEST 3D, CRIMI-
NAL LAW key # 795(1) (1986); WEST'S CRIMINAL LAw key # 795(2.90) (WESTLAW).
Notably, in the unreported case of United States v. Ibn-Tamas, where a new trial was
granted because of a contingent fee, there was an objection by the defense to a lesser-
included charge. 407 A.2d 626, 640 (D.C.Ct.App. 1979) (appeal after re-trial); see, infra,
note 155 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
144 See Schoonover v. State, 543 P.2d 881 (Kan. 1975); State v. Labonville, 492 A.2d
1376 (N.H. 1985); People v. Winkler, 523 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
145 Downs v. State, 453 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 1984).
146 See cases cited supra note 144; Cf. Fuller v. Israel, 421 F.Supp. 582 (E.D. Ill. 1976)
(no ineffective assistance resulted from agreement with attorney to share in royalties if
book about client's murder case was published; client pleaded guilty and claimed plea
was in lawyer's financial interest because it kept information for the book from being
revealed at a trial).
147 Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
148 People v. Winkler, 71 N.Y.2d 592, 596, 523 N.E.2d 485, 487, 528 N.Y.S.2d 360,
363 (1988).
149 Id. The defendant's claim of ineffective assistance was ultimately rejected after a
hearing on remand, the court finding that the trial strategy was essentially dictated by
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Research has revealed only two cases where a successful claim
of ineffectiveness of counsel was premised upon a contingent fee
agreement. In the first, United States v. Murphy, S the defendant had
killed her husband. The attorney-client contract provided that the
fee could come out of insurance proceeds that were contingent on
acquittal.15 1 The defendant was convicted of first degree murder.
Unbeknownst to the defendant, the prosecutor had offered to cap
the charge at second degree murder if she pled guilty to murder
generally before trial. Defense counsel did not communicate the of-
fer to his client until he knew it was too late, and did not request that
lesser-included charges be instructed to the jury. 152
Stating that "[it is hard to imagine a more striking example of
blatant conflict between personal interest and professional duty,"153
the court held that the contingent fee contract created a conflict of
interest, and that the defendant would have pleaded guilty to sec-
ond degree murder with proper counseling. 54 A writ of habeas
corpus vacating the conviction was granted.
In the second case, United States v. Ibn-Tamas,155 the trial judge
found that during a recess in a murder trial, just before the defend-
ant was to take the stand, the lawyer asked her to sign an agreement
under which he would be paid $70,000 from life insurance proceeds
on the victim-husband.' 56 The client refused to sign, became hys-
terical and rushed from the courthouse.' 57 That night after much
haggling she agreed to pay $40,000.158 Although the client did tes-
tify the next day, the court ruled the damage had been done-"the
attorney-client relationship was completely ruptured and torn asun-
der at this direct juncture .... "159 The judge found that payment
under the policy was contingent upon acquittal. 160 Although coun-
sel had earlier approached the prosecutor seeking a plea-bargain, he
never discussed this with the defendant and never followed up, per-
haps because of the fee arrangement.' 6 1 The court ruled that the
the client and his story. People v. Winkler, Westchester Co. Ct., N.Y.L.J., July 24, 1990,
p. 21, col. 6.
150 349 F.Supp. 818 (E.D.Pa. 1972).
151 Id. at 820.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 823.
154 Id.
155 See, Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 628 n.1, 640-41 (D.C. Cir. 1979).








right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated and vacated
the murder conviction.
162
Vacating a conviction upon a finding of ineffective assistance of
counsel cannot be an effective remedy for contingent fee conflict (if
conflict there be), for most such adverse interest representation will
not cause the objectively clear ineffective assistance of counsel that
courts require to award the relief of a new trial.163 It is more practi-
cal to ameliorate conflicts, if any, before the harm is done, as is sug-
gested above in connection with lesser included offense instructions
being given when the conflict comes to light. 164
iii. Criminal Contingency vs. Civil Contingency
Civil contingent fees have long been accepted. Criminal con-
tingent fees are no better or worse than civil contingent fees. Why,
then, should criminal contingent fees be prohibited?
If a criminal contingent fee creates a conflict of interest in the
ALI "substantial risk" sense, civil contingent fees also cause such
conflicts, as where a lawyer might be induced to recommend too low
a settlement by the desire to grab a quick fee without much labor, or
where a lawyer might wish to try a case to a hopefully larger verdict
than a profferred settlement that the client ought to accept. MacK-
innon's report on contingent fees stated that there is little objective
information on ethical problems arising from the civil fee. 165 He
noted that the fee arrangement can lead to a disparity between at-
torney and client in willingness to take a risk on a large recovery as
against no recovery at all, but he was unable to provide hard evi-
dence on this point.166 MacKinnon also believed that there is usu-
ally a convergence of interest of the attorney and the client in the
settlement area since a greater settlement increases the recovery for
both. 167 Later commentators, however, found evidence that civil
contingent fees reward the lawyer with fast, cheap settlements. 16
When comparing civil and criminal contingent conflicts, one
162 Id. at 640-41, 646.
163 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 491 (1978) (multiple representation con-
flict: "... to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics,
and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible."). Contra, Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 n.7 (1989), discussed infra, Part
VI.
164 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
165 MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 195.
166 Id. at 199.
167 Id. at 196.
168 Murray L. Schwartz & DanielJ.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee
in Personal-Injuty Litigation, 22 STAN. L.RE v. 1125 (1970).
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immediately notices that the criminal lawyer on straight contingency
would not have the civil lawyer's incentive of some fee from settle-
ment to operate as a counterweight to unreasonably gambling on a
trial. But the civil conflict inducement is still present. The differ-
ence between the civil fee and a criminal contingent fee that de-
pends solely upon acquittal is a matter of degree only, for the civil
attorney might still unreasonably push toward a trial in a misguided
effort to earn a higher contingency fee than that obtainable from
settlement. 1
69
One must consider whether the ethical and legal allowance of
the civil contingent fee conflict entails that the criminal conflict must
be allowed for the sake of consistency. The answer might turn on
whether the stakes are too high in criminal cases to permit a conflict
acceptable in civil litigation, but the existence of "higher stakes"
seems to be an ad hoc, unprincipled criterion, especially given the
absence of other regulation aimed at criminal fees.170 While many
criminal cases do involve higher stakes than civil cases, it is far from
clear that this fact should make us wary of allowing criminal contin-
gent fees while civil contingent fees are approved. The "stakes are
higher" argument as a supposed reason for banning criminal con-
tingent fees is a reasonable conclusion that the fees could cause
problems that are unacceptable in criminal cases, but the apparent
force of the conclusion is diluted by the absence of sufficient empiri-
cal data on lawyers' actual conduct when operating on a criminal
contingent fee.
iv. Contingent Fees vs. Retainers, Hourly Fees, and "Stairstep"
As was discussed earlier, criminal lawyers commonly seek non-
refundable retainers, but may also work on hourly fees or "stair-
step" arrangements where the fee is geared to identifiable litigation
stages. 17' A real-world examination of criminal contingent fees
should not assess them in a vacuum, but rather compare them to
existing fee arrangments. What is most striking in the criminal de-
fense context is the practice of many clients of paying the entire fee
"up front" combined with the high percentage of criminal cases that
are settled by plea-bargain.1 72 While plea bargaining is obviously
often in the client's interest-defense lawyers have an affirmative
169 State v. Labonville, 492 A.2d 1376, 1379 (N.H. 1985).
170 MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.5.
171 See supra Part IV.A.
172 ChiefJustice Burger estimated that about ninety per cent of all defendants plead
guilty. See Address of Chief Justice Burger at ABA Annual Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
1970, at 24, quoted in LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 55, at § 20.1(c) n.32.
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duty to explore plea bargainst'73-there is always the danger that the
plea bargain will be sought against the client's interests. This could
happen because the lawyer has already been paid and any further
time he spends on a case simply reduces his effective rate. 174 The
supposed dangers of criminal contingent fees pale beside the image
of the lawyer gobbling up plea-bargain cases as quickly as possible;
at least the "dangerous" contingent fee cases will go to trial.
Hourly fees and stairstep arrangments also lead to inherent
conflicts because the attorney's pay depends upon the amount of
work he does and the duration of the trial. These fee systems set the
stage for conflicts fueled by the attorney's interest in earning as
much as possible by running up hours. Oddly, the ABA Standards
of Criminal Justice make no mention whatsoever of the conflicts of
interest caused by the "orthodox" fee arrangements.1
75
In the absence of data, the reasonable hypothesis is that while
contingent fees may create conflicts, they do not create any more
conflicts than other widely-used and widely-accepted fee
arrangements.
v. Regulating Contingency Conflicts
Just as civil contingent fees are not banned but regulated, 176
criminal contingent fees could also be regulated instead of being
prohibited. The fee could take into account gradations in the out-
come of the case; in that way the attorney would not be risking his
entire fee on acquittal, and conflicts arising from the incentive to
seek acquittal would be substantially lessened. Regulation could re-
quire that a plea bargain could occasion a smaller fee, instead of no
fee.1 77 A contingent fee payable on a plea-bargained lesser offense
could theoretically cause the lawyer to recommend a poor plea bar-
gain instead of going to trial in a triable case and risking "guilty as
173 ABA STANDARDS., supra note 43, Rule 4-6.1.
174 Ryan L. Petty, Fee-Setting and Fee-Collection Practices among Criminal Defense
Attorneys in the State of Texas 5, 6 (Fall 1973) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
University of Texas Law School Library) noted in Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attor-
ney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE LJ. 1179, 1200 (1975); see also, How TO SET FEES,
supra note 112, passim.
175 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, Rule 4-1.6 states that the client's interests are par-
amount and personal advantage should not influence the lawyer's performance, but the
reference is to an attorney's aggrandizement through publicity, not financial arrange-
ments. Id. at Rule 4.22 cmt. See also, id. at Rule 4-6.1(b); id. at Rules 4.70-.73 cmt.
(remarks on exploring plea bargaining do not mention financial conflict of interest); id.
at Rule 4-5.2(a) (client decides what plea to enter); id. at Rules 4.66-.67 cmt. (silent re
conflict).
176 Gair v. Peck, 160 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960).
177 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 538 (1986).
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charged" thereby foregoing any fee, but this danger seems much
less real than the possibility of a lawyer's pleading a client guilty
under a move to grab a quick nonrefundable retainer.
Regulation could also require that any contingent arrangement
be disclosed to the court. In this manner, the trial judge could make
sure the client understands the ramifications of possible conflicts of
interest. This is analogous to the current practice of giving detailed
explanations of his or her rights to a criminal defendant who pleads
guilty, even though the defendant's lawyer presumably has already
explained this.' 78 A similar conflict also arises in the settlement of
class actions, where a plaintiff's attorney stands to recover attor-
ney's fees from the defendant directly or out of the recovery for the
class. The class action conflict is handled by requiring the court to
approve the settlement. 179 Requiring judicial approval of pleas in
forfeiture cases would enable the judge to inquire sharply of the
prosecutor as well as the defense attorney to uncover any deal-mak-
ing in derogation of the client's interest.
The Supreme Court's recent assertion °80 that any problems
arising out of a contingent fee can be handled by vacating the con-
viction for ineffective assistance of counsel unsatisfactorily places
the matter after the fact, when courts are disinclined to "unscramble
the omelet" and subtle issues of fact such as motivations of attorney
and client must be imperfectly resolved."8 Judicial inquiry before
the plea or jury instructions would tackle the contingency problem
at a time when the process can still help the defendant.
vi. Critique of the Conflict Rationale
What is missing from discussions of criminal contingent fees
and conflict of interest is the psychology of litigators-their intense
desire to obtain the best result their skills can achieve. Conflict of
interest analysis should not woodenly proceed without account of
the criminal lawyer's ever-present motive to obtain a better-than-
expected result. This strong motive is what keeps the attorney's and
client's interests united, contingent fee or not. Only an attorney
who is a general danger to the public, contingent fee or not, is going
to accept a poor result in the case for the sake of the fee; this propo-
sition follows from the psychological disposition of criminal lawyers.
178 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c),(d); see also, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
179 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); see also, 7B CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY
K. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE sec. 1797.1 (2d ed. 1986) (court alert to
conflict of interest problems).
180 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
181 See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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Lawyers who would sacrifice the client for a contingent fee are so
corrupted that they are a hazard to their client regardless of the fee
arrangement.
This is not mere intuition or fantasy. The New York Court of
Appeals, surely no den of naivete, believes that fixed fee and hourly
fee conflicts are avoided mostly by attorneys' honor and fidelity to
their responsibilities.1 8 2 This thought is easily applicable to contin-
gent fee "conflicts."
Given the unlikelihood of acquittal in most cases, the conflict
rationale for the contingent ban is based on an unnecessarily para-
noid premise. Those few cases that any single lawyer would take on
a straight acquittal-contingency basis will appear so strong that the
client's interest will normally lie in attempting to obtain an acquit-
tal. 83 The fee will spur the attorney on to complete the enormous
amount of preparation required for cases going to trial.184 There
just won't be straight acquittal-contingent fee arrangments in cases
with less than an exceedingly strong likelihood of acquital. If it be-
comes apparant, during the course of the trial, that the fee arrange-
ment is unwise for the attorney because acquittal is improbable, the
attorney is not going to fight a quixotic battle for this improbable
acquittal in an attempt to earn a fee. By hypothesis, the attorney
stands a slim chance of earning the fee that way, and in the process
he or she practices bad law with all the unpalatable consequences
for him or her that that entails.
Whether to ask for lesser-included offenses at a time when the
attorney has already done nearly all of the trial work and sees his or
her fee hanging on an acquittal is more problematic. Here again,
however, any sense of decency the lawyer has will prevent him or
her from sacrificing the client and reputation to a conviction on the
top charge. Because few cases are likely to be attractive to lawyers
on a pure acquittal-contingency basis, the attorney's interest will lie
in a graduated contingency arrangement. This interest is in accord
with the client's in seeking a lesser-included offense instruction (or,
for that matter, a plea-bargain). As it is, clients are probably the
largest source of objection to lesser-included charge instructions
anyway.' 8 5
182 People v. Winkler, 71 N.Y.2d 592, 523 N.E.2d 485, 528 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1988).
183 But cf. People v. Winkler, 128 A.D.2d 153, 163, 515 N.Y.S.2d 488, 495 (1987), rev'd
on other grounds, 71 N.Y.2d 596, 528 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1988) (change in strategy may be
warranted as litigation progresses).
184 WOLFRAM, supra note 177, at 537.
185 Whether to seek a lesser included offense instruction is the client's decision to
make. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, Rule 4-5.2 cmt. at 4.68.
1991]
LUSHING
In the final analysis, all statements to date (including those in
this Article) about contingent criminal fees are necessarily specula-
tive. One could therefore conclude that the burden of proof on
those who would continue the ban has not been satisfied according
to empirical requirements. While this approach might seem not to
give weight to the collective wisdom of the rule-makers, experienced
attorneys and judges who are often allowed to form opinions with-
out formal empirical evidence, the worth of what the bench and bar
believe without formally compiled data is questionable. For exam-
ple, when the Supreme Court found televising of trials to be uncon-
stitutional it noted the ABA Judicial Canons prohibition 18 6 and
stated that television would infect the trial in various horrible ways
which the Court detailed at length.187 When, seventeen years later,
the Court about-faced and permitted televised trials, it noted that
"no one has been able to present empirical data sufficient to estab-
lish that the mere presence of the broadcast media inherently has an
adverse impact on that process."' 8
8
The real problem is that the ban on criminal contingent fees is
propped up not just by the conflict of interest argument but by
other specious rationales, and by a calcified and mostly unques-
tioned tradition. 8 9 Only after those other rationales are discarded
and an experimental allowance of contingent fees begins will a
forthright assessment of the conflict of interest problem be made.
C. SUPPOSED IMMORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL BAR AS A REASON FOR
THE BAN
More than one commentator has opined that the true basis for
the contingency ban is the image of the criminal lawyer as a lesser
moral breed than his civil peers.190 This "rationale" is hardly more
than a group libel. Judging groups of people adversely derogates
not only a national policy not to discriminate, but also common
186 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1964).
187 Id. at 545-49.
188 Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 578-79 (1981). Compare Perry v. Leeke, 488
U.S. 272 (1989) (it is an "empirical predicate of our system" that permitting a witness to
consult with counsel after direct but prior to cross-examination is less likely to lead to
discovery of truth, even assuming no witness deceit.) with Chandler at 605 (Marshall, J.
dissenting) (majority provides not "a shred of evidence" to support its "empirical
predicate.").
189 1 GEOFFREY HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HAND-
BOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT sec. 1.5:501 (1990) ("The rule
against contingent fees in criminal cases has been 'traditional' for so long that it has few
serious opponents.").




sense. Disparagement of the criminal bar as a basis for its regula-
tion is doubly wrong because the negativism often rests on an im-
permissible identification of the lawyer with his criminal clients. 19 1
Moreover, it is wrong because, at the time the contingent fee ar-
rangement is entered into, the client is only an accused, not an adju-
dicated criminal. In comparison, the civil contingency bar, which is
sometimes euphemistically accused of "building a case"-making
up evidence-would not be immune in a name-calling contest. 192 In
general, the criminal bar fee practices outlined earlier do not be-
speak a character defect when compared with civil fee practices,
which commonly include padding up fee hours and charging "what
the traffic will bear."'19
Certainly the early courts that prohibited recovering on crimi-
nal contingent fee contracts seemed to despise what criminal law-
yers do, if not the criminal lawyers themselves. The court in Weber v.
Shay 194 expressed the thought that heading off an indictment was
against public policy regardless of the means used. The case did not
involve a contingent fee contract, but through its prominent citation
by MacKinnon it has served as a legal cornerstone for the criminal
contingent fee ban. 195 Peyton v. Margiotta 196, also cited by MacKin-
non, held that assistance in obtaining a pardon on a contingent fee
was improper, but the court did not emphasize the contingent fee as
the problem, relying instead on a precedent involving pardons. The
Peyton court cited reasoning in the precedent that one cannot
purchase a pardon by paying off the governor, and held that a law-
yer cannot "bribe" others to deceive the governor to obtain a par-
don. 197 Thus, all contracts to obtain pardons by use of money, even
to pay for a lawyer's services, were held void. 1
98
Other contingent fee cases cited by Peyton conjured up a danger
of contingency inducement to sinister acts as a matter of mere judi-
cial surmise. 199 The court in Ormerod v. Dearman 200, a contingent fee
191 Brickman, supra note 135, at 40.
192 MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 200.
193 Susan Beck & Michael Orey, Skaddenomics, Am. LAW., Sept. 1991, at 3; Billing: Is
Padding Wuespread?, 76 A.B.AJ. 42 (Dec. 1990); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 659, 705-20 (1990); Stephen Labaton, Lawyers Clash on Plan to Hear Asbestos
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1991, at D2 col. 5.
194 46 N.E. 377, 380 (Ohio 1897).
195 See MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 52; TRIAL LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT, supra
note 107.
196 156 A.2d 865, 868 (Pa. 1959).
197 Id. at 867 (citing Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts 152 (Pa. 1838)).
198 Id.
199 See Peyton v. Margiotti, 156 A.2d 865 (Pa. 1959).
200 100 Pa. 561, 563 (1882).
1991] 527
LUSHING
case, thought it deeply wrong for an attorney to settle a fornication
prosecution with the client's payment to the complaining husband.
The Restatement (First) of Contracts placed its ban on criminal con-
tingent fees in the subdivision on "Bargains Tending To Obstruct
the Administration of Justice." 201 And in contemporary times, the
New York Court of Appeals went so far as to express worry that
criminal lawyers would enter into contingent fee contracts so as to
be able to torpedo convictions on the grounds of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. This last court paints a portrait of the criminal law-
yer with an atomic bomb strapped to his back, ready to damn
himself in open court as both ineffective and unethical, just for the
sake of winning one (last) case.
20 2
Popular folklore distrusts criminal lawyers, but then again pop-
ular folklore distrusts all lawyers. 203 Throughout history many law-
yers, including criminal practitioners themselves, have viewed
criminal lawyers askance, questioning the need for a criminal bar
altogether,204 and finding the notion of a treatise on criminal prac-
tice ethics jocular.20 5 Prosecutors often think that criminal lawyers
are of criminal morality, especially those who appear in organized
crime cases. 20 6 Recent legislation and prosecutorial policy leading
to inquiries of criminal lawyers regarding their fees shows that crim-
inal lawyers are still generally viewed as less than trustworthy.
20 7
What bothers those who premise opposition to criminal contin-
gent fees upon the immorality of the criminal bar is the inducement
to subornation of perjury and other obstructions of justice in the
supposed singleminded drive toward acquittal. 208 An answer to this
concern was given in a civil context by an ABA delegate in 1908
when the Canons of Ethics were being debated:
The contention that there is any more perjury or subornation of per-
jury in cases prosecuted upon contingent fee contracts than in those in
which that feature is wanting, or than there is in the defense of such
201 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNTRAcTs secs. 540-558 (1933).
202 People v. Winkler, 71 N.Y.2d 592, 523 N.E.2d 485, 528 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1988).
203 Wall, supra note 117, at 3.
204 GEORGE W. WARRELLE, LEGAL ETHics 145 (2d ed. 1920), quoted in Wall, supra note
117, at 3.
205 JOHN M. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHics v (1989) (author told "it should be a
pretty short book.").
206 David W. Louisell, Criminal Discovey: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAL. L. REV. 56,
99 (1961).
207 See Tarlow, supra note 119, at 45; Zimmermann & Lavine, Attorney Subpoenas Imperil
Choice of Counsel, Apr. TRIAL 51 (1990).
208 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, at Rule 4.37 ("corrupt tactics"; "danger of
abuse"); see also ROBERT H. ARONSON, ArORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULA-
TION AND REVIEW 97 (1980).
528 [Vol. 82
CRIMINAL CONTINGENT FEES
actions, rests solely in assertion. Repetition has gained for it some
measure of acceptance without any kind of competent proof.... What
reason is there to believe that any lawyer, whose moral stamina would
otherwise have maintained him in uprightness, will yield under the ad-
ded influence of the fact that he gets a fee only in case his client
prevails?
2 09
As one eminent commentator has pointed out, the inducement to
perjury argument misconceives the risks involved on the one hand,
and existing pressures to commit perjury on the other.210 It can
also be hypothesized that the criminal bar is less subject to pressures
to litigate criminally than the civil bar because criminal lawyers are
under the watchful gaze of prosecutors and law enforcement per-
sonnel as their case wends it way through the system.
The reasonableness of blanket distrust of the criminal bar as a
posture has been questioned by commentators2 11 and lawyers.
2 12
As with susceptibility to conflict of interest temptations, the sup-
posed immorality of the criminal bar is a popular notion that simply
is not grounded on formal evidence. It may be that the distrust of
the criminal bar as a basis for the contingent fee ban is a socially
acceptable substitute for distrust of law enforcement personnel.
Prosecutors and policemen work for a government salary, and for
this reason-if one is inclined to join the morality speculators-
might be thought to be especially vulnerable to corruption attempts,
perhaps more than civil contingent lawyers' counterparts, insurance
lawyers whose incomes are often fairly large.
Supposed lack of moral fiber in the criminal bar as a reason for
special regulation is an historical prejudice, anachronistic in an age
that rejects "groupthink." The prejudice is also a hangover from
the days of associating the "mouthpiece" lawyer with his client in an
effort to disarm the client by denying that his lawyer is an independ-
ent moral agent. 213 Currently the prejudice may be more a projec-
tion by the bar of what the public fears criminal lawyers will do to
earn their fees than a belief held by the bar leaders themselves.2 14
209 ABA REPORTS, supra note 85, at 71, 73-75 (speaker was against the canon because
it provided for judicial supervision of the fee.).
210 WOLFRAM, supra note 177, at 537.
211 Id. at 537-38. See also, Brickman, supra note 20, at 29; HAZARD & HODES, supra note
189, at 84 (incentive for perjury in civil actions as well).
212 Wall, supra note 117 at 3, 4.
213 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, 4-1.1 at 4.9 cmt.





Several additional reasons have been given for the ban on crim-
inal contingent fees. These reasons prove to be even less compel-
ling than conflict of interest and inducement to corruption.
i. Lack of Res
One argument often advanced against criminal contingent fees
is that, while a successful plaintiff's civil suit produces a res with
which to pay the contingent fee, there is no res produced in a suc-
cessful criminal defense. Civil contingent fees, however, are permit-
ted in cases that do not produce a res, such as defense work.
215
Moreover, a successful criminal defense can produce a res, in the
form of life insurance or an estate that the client, having been exon-
erated, may inherit,2 16 illegally seized funds returned to the cli-
ent,2 1 7 the right to commercialize the client's story218 , or even a
productive worker-the freed client himself
2 19
The fundamental problem with the res rationale is that it is illog-
ical. While a produced res enables the civil plaintiff to pay his attor-
ney, there are ways of paying a lawyer without a produced res, in
particular from the client's assets. Notably, the res rationale was ad-
ded to the ABA Model Code ban on criminal contingent fees after
the tentative draft.2 20 The 1968 draft had simply stated that
"[plublic policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements in
criminal cases"-without identifying the policy or mentioning a
reS. 22 1
215 See, e.g., Nassau County (Long Island, N.Y.) Bar Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Op. 90-12, reported in April 17, 1990 N.Y.L.J. 6 (1990). A lawyer repre-
senting a defendant in a civil action for forfeiture of assets as proceeds of a crime (N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R. secs. 1310-56 (McKinney 1990)) inquired if he could work on a con-
tingent fee. The Bar Association approved the fee because it was a civil action. See
generally, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Contract Providing for Contingent Fee
to Defendant's Attorney, 9 A.L.R.4TH 191 (1981).
216 See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 349 F.Supp. 818 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Schoonover v.
State, 543 P.2d 881 (Kan. 1975).
217 See Wall, supra note 117, at 3, 4.
218 See BURKOFF, supra note 205, at 11-8 n.15. "Son of Sam" laws may prohibit this.
See N.Y. ExEc. LAw sec. 632-a (McKinney 1982). See, e.g., Children of Bedford, Inc. v.
Petromelis, 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541 (1991). Moreover, acquisition of publishing
rights prior to the conclusion of a case might be unethical. ABA STANDARDS, supra note
43, at Rule 4-3.4.
219 Brickman, supra note 20, at 41. See also Wall, supra note 117, at 3, 4.






Another argument that has been advanced is that while contin-
gent fees are a necessary evil to enable indigent civil litigants to hire
a lawyer,222 indigent criminal defendants will have a lawyer ap-
pointed free of charge by the court. The contingent evil, this argu-
ment goes, is therefore not necessary. 223 This argument is flawed
because it rests on the assumption that criminal defendants choos-
ing to utilize a contingent fee will be entitled to court-appointed
counsel. That is not necessarily the case. For just as civil litigants
capable of paying an hourly rate sometimes choose to utilize a con-
tingent fee, so too may similarly situated criminal defendants. In-
deed, the very fact that civil contingent fees are permitted even in
cases where the client can afford an hourly rate224 belies the conten-
tion that contingent fees are an evil to be avoided where possible.
In point of fact, not only can anything said against the criminal
contingent fee be equally said against the civil contingent fee, but a
lot more can be said against the latter: Criminal lawyers cannot, like
civil lawyers, go around creating or pumping up frivolous cases.
The "necessary evil" argument, even when seasoned with the no-
tion that "criminal stakes are higher, ' 225 is more a debating point
than a ground for the contingent fee ban.
iii. Overreaching
It could be argued that contingent fees are overreaching in that
the criminal client is too scared and desperate to turn down what an
attorney offers him in the way of an unreasonably high contingent
fee. It is hard to imagine, however, how contingent fees could over-
reach any more than, or as much as, the present system with its reli-
ance upon the attorney's self-interested judgment as to what is a
"reasonable" fee. As one judge has stated, "the range of fees for
handling pleas of guilty is especially wide, and it is inexplicable in
terms of any rational distinctions .... One lawyer may charge five
or ten times what another lawyer would ... "226
The possibilities for overreaching are not especially characteris-
222 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, at 4.37; Richard M. Birnholz, The Validity and
Propriety of Contingent Fee Controls, 37 UCLA L. REv. 949, 953 (1990).
223 F.B. MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 53; See also, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, at
Rule 4.37.
224 Brickman, supra note 20, at 43; MODEL CODE, supra note 4, at EC 2-20.
225 See supra, Part IV.B.iii.
226 United States v. Vague, 521 F.Supp. 147, 154-55 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (court sua sponte
reduces fee). See also United States v. Vague, 697 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1983) (court had no
power to reduce fee; contempt finding against lawyer reversed).
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tic of a contingent fee, certainly not when compared with an hourly
arrangement, which naturally induces hour padding, or with a stair-
step fee, which creates a similar incentive to prolong litigation. In-
deed, problems caused by contingent fees and hourly and stairstep
arrangements all pale beside those generated by the common crimi-
nal defense practice of obtaining a nonrefundable retainer.
227
227 ABA rules require the lawyer to take into account "the time and labor required" as
a first factor in setting a fee. Predictions to the client as to how much time and labor will
result after an hourly agreement or "fixed amount," as distinguished from an "estimated
amount," are not mentioned in the Rule or commentary, MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at
Rule 1.5 cmt. The basic rate can be an "estimated amount," but there is no requirement
to mention an estimated number of hours if an hourly charge is decided upon, and it is
only the "estimated amount" that must be revised in the event of a change in circum-
stances. Id. The ABA's current ethics code states in a comment that if the fee is paid in
advance, the unearned portion should be returned, but apparently this is a reference to
terminations of the attorney-client relationship by attorney withdrawal. Id. The com-
ment confusingly cites the ethics provision dealing with termination by withdrawal of the
attorney, not termination by any completion of the attorney-client relationship. See, Id.
at Rule 5.4. The previous ABA ethics code also explicitly mandated return of unearned
fees in the context of an attorney who withdrew from employment. MODEL CODE, supra
note 4, at DR 2-1 10(A)(3). Presumably there would not be a need for specific regulation
in the withdrawal context if all attorneys, withdrawing or not, had to return unearned
fees at the conclusion of the representation.
The subject of returning unearned fees is confused by a distinction between specific
retainers, applicable to specified services, and general retainers, which pay for what
amounts to an option on the lawyer's services, reserving his time, and precluding him
from getting involved with other clients whose interests are in conflict with the retaining
client. Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impernissi-
ble under Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract Law, 57 FORD. L.REv. 149, 157-59 (1988). The
current provision is MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a). Some ethics
opinions indicate that a nonrefundable retainer is proper so long as it is reasonable,
Disciplinary Board of Hawaii Supreme Court Op. 2 9 (1985) reported in ABA/BNA MAN-
UAL, supra note 102, at 801:2802 at 30, or complies with DR 2-106 of the MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY as not being illegal or clearly excessive. Other opinions
ban nonrefundable retainers per se, Kansas Bar Association Op. 84-12 (1984) reported in
ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note 102, at 801:3819 at 45. If any fees must be returned
under ABA strictures it is unearned fees, Bar Association of Nassau County (New York)
Op. 85-5 (1985), reported in ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note 102, at 801:6208 at 45; ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Op. 998 (1967), reported in 2
ABA INFORMAL ETHics OPINIONS 161, 165 (1975). Also, the opinions consider an
amount paid to option the attorney's services as an earned fee. Bar Association of
Greater Cleveland Op. 84-1 (1984), reported in ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note 102, at
801:6952 at 94. This fact must be explained to the client. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at
Rule 1.5(a)(2). More than one ethics opinion has taken the position that how much must
be returned as "unearned" is not an ethics question at all. State Bar of Arizona Op. 262
(1969), reported in OLAVI MARU, 1970 SUPPLEMENT TO THE DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION
ETHics OPINIONS #6016, p. 134 (1974); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Informal Op. 916 (1966), reported in 2 ABA INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 64
(1985).
An ABA opinion clearly endorses keeping unearned retainers that do not involve
options. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1389
(1977), reported in ABA FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 278 (1985): "There is
nothing improper in a lawyer charging and being paid a fixed fee in advance for legal
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Against this backdrop of existing "ethical" fee-setting practices, it
strains the imagination to see contingent fees as overreaching. 228
work on tax matters or litigation before the Tax Court if... the fixed fee embraces all
work to be done, whether it be relatively simple and of short duration, or complex and
protracted." Id. This statement seems to approve a fixed fee that results in much less
than the onerous work that was potentially present and paid for. The opinion was in
response to the question whether it was proper to charge a fixed fee for tax planning
"which would also cover representation of the client in the event of... audit.. . and in
possible litigation before the Tax Court. If either the audit or the Tax Court litigation
did not ensue, the lawyer would keep the fee." Id. (emphasis added). Perhaps this eth-
ics opinion assumes that the lawyer has presented to the client an honest assessment of
the chances of audit and litigation, so that the client knows the probability of the lawyer
having to do extensive work beyond the tax planning.
228 There is not much case law on the legality of nonrefundable retainers. See, Brick-
man & Cunningham, supra note 227, at 150. The highest court of New York recently
dealt with the issue in one case with inconclusive results, holding that the particular
agreement was ambiguous and so it was unnecessary to reach the question of whether
nonrefundable retainer agreements were legal. Jacobson v. Sassower, 488 N.E.2d 1283,
1284 (N.Y. 1985). A matrimonial client agreed to a non-refundable retainer of $2,500,
and prior to trial discharged the attorney without cause. Jacobson v. Sassower, 452
N.Y.S.2d 981, 982 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1982). She sued to recover $1,500 as unearned fees.
Id. The trial court found for plaintiff on the ground that the fee contract improperly
penalized the client for exercising the right to discharge the attorney, holding the fee
was a "special retainer", i.e., an advance fee for future services, not a "true" or "general
retainer", for services during a fixed period and intended to compensate the attorney
for being conflicted out of representing anybody else in the case. Id. at 984. The court
placed reliance on the absence of contractual language designating the $2,500 as a
"minimum fee." Id at 985. The court stated that if services are continued to "comple-
tion" the client has no claim to refund. Id. at 982. But what if "completion" includes, as
this contract seemingly provided for, reconciliation of the spouses. The court was silent
on this point, since there was no reconciliation, but a difference in result because of
spousal reconciliation would allow non-refundable retainers of substantial size without
substantial labor.
The Supreme Court, Appellate Term affirmed the Civil Court's holding by a vote of
2-1. The court stated the attorney was relegated to recovery of the fee on a quantum
meruit basis for services rendered, while noting the lawyer's argument as to the propriety
of nonrefundable retainers as "demonstrated by their widespread use, especially among
attorneys practicing matrimonial and criminal law." Jacobson v. Sassower, 474 N.Y.S.2d
167, 169 (N.Y. App. Term 1983)(per curiam). Again, the court discussed the issue only
in the context of discharged attorneys. Id. The dissent would have placed the burden
on the client to show unreasonableness or unfairness of the fee agreement. Id. at 171
(Parness, J. dissenting).
Next, the Appellate Division affirmed 4-1 in a brief opinion on the ground the re-
tainer agreement was ambiguous. Jacobson v. Sassower, 483 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985). The court stated that whether such retainers are uneforceable as uncon-
sciounable or as chilling the right to discharge the attorney depends on the facts of the
particular case: "[s]uch retainers, while not to be encouraged, are not, in all cases, un-
enforceable as a matter of law." Id. at 712. The dissent said the contract was clearly like
a "requirements contract" under which the attorney was obligated to supply all the spe-
cific services the client needed during a certain period, and the attorney was thus com-
mitted to providing such services. Id. (Kupferman, J. dissenting). Absent
unconscionability, the nonrefundable retainer clause was not per se invalid, and the very
contract in the case had been held ethical in a grievance proceeding. Id.
Finally, the Court of Appeals also affirmed, supra, on the ground the agreement was
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If overreaching actually proved to be a problem in practice,
courts or legislatures could set maximum contingent fee structures
just as is now done with civil plaintiff contingent fees. 2 29 Civil maxi-
mums are percentages of the recovery; criminal maximums could be
based upon what lawyers generally charge those who are not rich or
involved in the most difficult cases. There could be a substantial
"kicker" in the regulated fee because of its contingency. Lawyers
who did not like the maximums could, of course, turn down contin-
gent fee cases. In sum, overreaching, if it arose, would present chal-
lenges easily mitigated by regulation.
A different issue is whether a contingent fee would be a poor
use of resources for the client. There is no ethics question here, for
the codes only prohibit " [un]reasonable" legal fees, and a contin-
gent fee is not per se unreasonable any more than a nonrefundable
retainer 230 or an hourly fee.23 ' Unless and until criminal contingent
fees are validated and data accumulated, there is no a priori way of
saying that they are less "reasonable" than nonrefundable retainers
or $350 an hour charges. Clients, patients, investors, and people
generally are permitted to take risks in this country, and the fee ar-
rangement in a criminal case, where going to trial itself can be a
considerable risk, does not appear to deserve unique paternalistic
supervision.
iv. Misleading the Client
Another argument against the criminal contingent fee is that it
misleads the client. One court has said that:
The attorney, by accepting a criminal case on a contingent fee basis
makes it appear to the client that he is using personal influence, or
something worse, to manipulate the judicial system in order to obtain
the promised result. This may lead the client to conclude that the ju-
dicial system is susceptible to manipulation. Fostering such beliefs is
prejudicial to the administration ofjustice.
232
A high retainer, however, could foster the same impression of
ambiguous and the client may not have understood it. Jacobsen v. Sassower, 488 N.E.
2d 1283 (N.Y. 1985). Therefore, it was "not necessary to reach plaintiff's further con-
tention that nonrefundable retainer agreements are against public policy and, therefore,
void." Id. at 1284-85.
229 See, e.g., 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Chapter IV, Article I, subarticle A, part
600, sec. 603.7(e)(2) (1986) (setting maximum contingent fee in personal injury and
wrongful death cases).
230 See supra note 227.
231 MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at Rule 1.5(a).
232 Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Nader, 472 So.2d 11, 13 (La. 1985) (disbarment for,




corruption. In fact, it is not clear why the contingent fee fosters the
impression of "buying justice" at all. It is logically possible that a
client might perceive the contingent lawyer's confidence as based
upon the lawyer's secret, sinister, sure-fire plan to win the case. Pre-
cisely the same misconception is possible for any client faced with a
demand for a large retainer; the client could believe that the re-
tainer is to be divided between the lawyer and a key official. Under a
contingent fee system, obtaining a fee depends upon obtaining a
favorable result, which makes having the case "in the bag" ex-
tremely important to protect the lawyer, or so the client might think.
Against this belief, lies the obvious fact that a crooked lawyer is not
likely to lay out his own money in advance to finance a bribery plot,
a presumed necessity in an imagined corrupt contingent fee.
Whether clients would be misled into believing that lawyers charg-
ing contingent fees possess a special touch their fellow mortals at
the bar do not, is no more an ethics question than is that of whether
people who select superstar attorneys by their media reputation are
making a sound decision.
v. Protection of the Bar
One commentator has suggested that the true goal of the ban
on criminal contingent fees is the prevention or restraint of compe-
tition from lawyers who might not collect the fee in advance.
23 3
Given the comparative rarity of cases that lawyers would want to
take on a contingency basis, this conspiracy theory seems even less
believable than the typical conspiratorial concerns.
Another commentator envisions the ban on contingent fees as a
means of forestalling the public perception that lawyers profit di-
rectly from frustrating law enforcement.23 4 This reason for prohib-
iting contingent fees should not be reflexively brushed off as just
another conjecture on poor public relations. If a lawyer earns
money because of an acquittal he is profiting from crime in a man-
ner fundamentally different from the other players in the criminal
justice system who process and prosecute criminals. The contingent
fee enriches the lawyer just because the crime has been made, with
his assistance, "perfect"-the client has gotten away with it. (That a
not-guilty verdict is suggestive of innocence in fact does not neces-
sarily carry much weight with observers.) Contingent fee lawyers
would gain from crimes being committed and going unpunished-this
233 Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L.
REv 702, 734 (1977); See also, Gaetke, supra note 214, at 60 ("unified and perpetual
front" against other fees clients might prefer).
234 Paul D. Carrington, The Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 DUKE LJ. 1291, 1307 (1979).
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public perception might indeed be too much for the bar.235
V. THE NICHE FOR CONTINGENT FEES
Assuming that criminal lawyers generally strive to get paid in
advance, the question arises whether abandonment of the prohibi-
tion of contingent fees would make any difference to any lawyer but
the youngest, hungriest, and most desperate for work. One re-
sponse to this query is a market explanation. Practical differences
from repeal of the ban are immaterial: If the ban is unsupportable,
general free market principles are sufficient to justify repeal. An-
other response is to simply postulate that, at the margins, at least
some lawyers and defendants would prefer contingent fees, and so
repeal would make a difference.
I suggest that there is a large class of clients who would find
contingent fees attractive, and that the size of this group in the mar-
ketplace might well attract attorneys willing to take at least occa-
sional gambles on total or partial23 6 contingency fees. A rich client
might demand that the lawyer work on a contingent fee, but lawyers
will find this unattractive in a case where the client is eminently able
to shell out without being guaranteed a result in the case. Poor cli-
ents, of course, are in no position to pay contingent fees. But the
middle class might find contingent fees very suitable, and its very
size would cause some lawyers to take the chance in suitable cases.
If one hypothetically stops the average middle class person on
the street and asks if he or she would rather pay a lawyer only if the
lawyer obtains a favorable result, the answer will be an enthusiastic
"yes." Such persons cannot afford to purchase the services of fa-
mous lawyers, but they do have reasonably substantial assets. A
member of the middle-class will be willing to part with a considera-
bly larger portion of these assets if he or she obtains something tan-
gible in return; acquittal or avoidance of a lengthy prison sentence.
Mere "professional services" are of little value. The average person
also believes that a contingent fee increases the lawyer's zeal.2 37
A common situation illustrates this point. A young man faces a
serious charge such as homicide or armed robbery. His family is not
at all happy at the prospect of paying $15,000 in advance for legal
235 It is at least logically possible, in fact, that some of the opposition to criminal
contingent fees comes from those who understand that contingent fees would improve
criminal defense representation-an unpleasant thought for many.
236 Partial contingency fees are prohibited by the ethics ban. New York State Bar Op.
412 (1975), reported in OLAVI MARU, 1975 SUPPLEMENT TO THE DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIA-
TION ETHICS OPINIONS Op. 9172 (1977).
237 Carrington, supra note 234, at 1293.
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representation of an indefinite nature leading to an unpredictable
result. Two or three thousand dollars probably seems about right
to them. The family would, however, happily sacrifice twice as much
as the $15,000 demanded by the well-regarded lawyer if their son
returned to them without having to go to prison at all, or for only a
few years. It is also not hard to imagine an honorable attorney will-
ing to take this chance with them, having sympathy for the client's
desire to avoid assigned counsel but being unwilling to take the case
on the comparatively paltry fee that the family was willing to ad-
vance. Such an attorney might have dozens of pending cases of vari-
ous sizes; a few contingency files in the office would spice things up
by virtue of both the gamble and the prospect of a larger than usual
fee.
Obviously, collecting contingency fees is as important to law-
yers as collections under traditional fee arrangements. Contingent
fees could be secured through a mortgage, or funds placed in es-
crow. Naturally, this would have to be done at the time the retainer
agreement is executed.
Agreements could provide for a combined partial contingency
fee and partially reduced retainer or reduced hourly rate. The
agreement might also provide for a lower fee for a result less
favorable than acquittal. 238 A client would not feel compelled to
turn down a plea bargain in order to save this lesser contingent fee
for he would owe even more money if he went to trial and were
acquitted. In any event, minimizing prison time would likely be
more important to him than money. 23 9
Another segment in which criminal contingent fees could suc-
238 See WoIRAM, supra note 177, at 538.
239 Sample clauses for the retainer agreement are set forth below:
MODEL CONTINGENT FEE CLAUSES
The compensation of Attorney shall be as follows:
In the event that all charges against client that attorney is hereby retained to
represent client on are terminated in the (superior/inferior) court in one or more of
the following manners, including any combination thereof: acquittal, dismissal with
prejudice, or dismissal without prejudice and the charge(s) not refiled within six
months after dismissal, then attorney shall be paid $X.
In the event that attorney has not earned the fee provided for in the first para-
graph, but in the further event client is not convicted of a felony (or retains driver's
license, professional license, is not sentenced to term greater than X years, is not
sentenced to incarceration, etc.) attorney shall be paid $Y.
If the contingent results described above are not obtained by attorney under
this retainer agreement, but come about as the result of appellate review by any
court of this State or the United States Supreme Court, then attorney shall be paid
$Z, even if attorney shall not have provided services in the prosecution of the ap-
peal. The obligation in this paragraph does not arise because of results obtained
through post conviction proceedings such as petition for writ of habeas corpus or
motion to vacate judgment of conviction.
[provision securing payment as by, e.g., mortgage or other security interest
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cessfully operate is in the twilight zone of indigency. Assessment of
a defendant's indigency in determining eligibility for court-ap-
pointed counsel involves nebulous standards. 240 Criminal defend-
ants and their families have an incentive to conceal financial
wherewithal from the court in an effort to get free counsel. Yet
some of these people might be willing to risk their assets against
freedom in a contingent fee arrangement in order to obtain counsel
of choice. If this inducement to gamble seems exploitative, it
should be borne in mind that such deceptive clients are not actually
eligible for free legal assistance but are only making themselves ap-
pear to be. Real and perceived abuse of the assigned counsel sys-
tem in the eligibility determination has been a special irritant to the
private defense bar. Contingent fees might free up clients for the
private market who do not belong on the legal aid dole.
It is also reasonable to assume that some of the financial and
industrial wizards whose indictments have recently attracted much
media coverage would be willing to bet with their lawyer on acquit-
tal for a larger fee than the normal charge. Considering the collos-
sal fines these defendants face, the gamble could make a lot of sense
to them and the attorney. One can imagine that such clients might
be willing to enter very sizable contingency fee arrangements.
These wealthy, white-collar defendants might even perceive the law-
yer willing to take such a gamble as a superior and more confident
champion than the lawyer who is not. Wealthy defendants probably
relish paying huge fees in a losing case even less than the middle
class does.
One reason to repeal the ban on contingent fees is to see
whether it is now depriving substantial numbers of clients of desired
private counsel. It is not fairly predictable whether a substantial
number of lawyers would move into the new market niche created
by legitimizing contingent fees. Even if some attorneys express dis-
dain toward contingent fees, that does not mean that all criminal
attorneys will shun such arrangements.
made conditional upon result in case, conditional assignment of bail funds or other
assets, escrow fund, etc.]
In addition to the above contingent obligations, client agrees to pay attorney,
regardless of the result obtained in the case, [a nonrefundable retainer, hourly fee,
stairstep arrangement, etc.].
Other items relating to compensation, including responsibility for expenses
and the scope of the attorney's representation, must be in the retainer agreement.
See, How TO SET FEES, supra note 112, for forms.
240 SHELDON KRANTZ, CHARLES SMITH, DAVID ROSSMAN, PAUL FROYD & JANIS HOFF-




VI. CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT LEGALIZE
CONTINGENT FEES
In 1989, the Supreme Court delivered a body blow to the pri-
vate defense bar by holding that attorneys' fees are subject to re-
straint and forfeiture.24 1 The Court explicitly accepted a contingent
fee arrangement when it rejected the argument that forfeiture pos-
sibilities would overly burden the right to counsel of one's choice.
The majority, in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,242 stated
that the burden is limited: "Defendants . . .may be able to find
lawyers willing to represent them, hoping that their fees will be paid
in the event of acquittal .... ,,243 In the face of the Court's pro-
nouncements implying the legitimacy of criminal contingent fees,
state ethics codes and contracts caselaw seem puny indeed.
A. CONTINGENCY IMPOSED BY POSSIBILITY OF FORFEITURE
The background of the Court's decision in Caplin & Drysdale was
the federal Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,244 which
amended both the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) statute 245 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
provision of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970.246 The amendment provides for forfeiture to the
Government of a guilty defendant's assets derived from or in other
ways related to the crime; this is accomplished through an investi-
ture of title to the assets in the government, the investiture relating
back to the time of the crime.247 Courts are authorized to restrain
transfer of potentially forfeitable assets prior to trial.248 If the de-
fendant is convicted, the jury then determines whether to forfeit
tainted assets, regardless of whether they have already been re-
strained or not.249
In United States v. Monsanto 2 50 and in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
241 Caplin & Drysdale, Chtd. v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 635 (1989). See also, Asset-
Forfeiture Ruling Outrages Bar, LEGAL TIMES, June 26, 1989, at 2; Drug Lawyers Leave Field,
Fearing Fees Will be Seized, WALL ST.J., Sept. 14, 1989, § 2 at p.1.
242 491 U.S. 617.
243 Id. at 625.
244 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, sec. 301, 98 Stat. 2040
(1984) (as amended and codified in relevant part at 21 U.S.C. sec. 853 et. seq. (1988)).
245 Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. secs. 1961-68
(1988).
246 Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act, 21 U.S.C. sec. 848 (1988).
247 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).
248 Id.
249 United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 559 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 395
(1990).
250 491 U.S. 600, 602 (1989).
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v. United States,251 the Supreme Court held that the statute applied to
attorneys' fees paid or to be paid for the defense of forfeiture cases,
so that the fees can be restrained and forfeited, and that as so ap-
plied to attorney's fees the statute was constitutional. The defense
in Caplin & Drysdale had argued before the Supreme Court that the
possibility of attorney forfeiture would create conflicts of interest
similar to those raised by criminal contingent fees.2 52 The attorney
would be allowed to collect his or her fee only if he or she defeated
the forfeiture by outright acquittal or by showing the fee was from
untainted funds. The defense argued that several conflicts would
potentially result. First, the attorney would fail to diligently investi-
gate the case in order to remain ignorant of the source of the fee
funds so that the attorney would hold the status of a bona fide pur-
chaser not subject to disgorgement of forfeited assets.2 53 Second,
the attorney would engage in plea bargaining against the client's in-
terest to keep the fee (i.e., through structuring the bargain to pro-
tect the fee in derogation of the client's principal interests)3254
Third, the attorney would risk going to trial and turning down a
plea bargain in order to gain acquittal and hence escape forfei-
ture.2 5 5 The ABA argued in an amicus brief that, if collection of the
fee is contingent on acquittal, serious ethical concerns are raised,
and it cited its own prohibition on criminal contingent fees.2 5 6 The
bulk of the ABA's ethics arguments were devoted to other
considerations. 257
Before the Supreme Court, the Government in Caplin & Drysdale
251 491 U.S. 617, 619 (1989).
252 Id. at 632-33 n. 10 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 36-37, Caplan & Drysdale, Chtd.
v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (No. 87-1729)).
253 Id. The attorney could release his fee from forfeited funds by establishing that he
is a bona fide purchaser for value of the funds who was reasonably without cause to
believe the funds were subject to forfeiture-a difficult burden for the very lawyer who
knows the client faces forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l)(6)(B) (1988); 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(n)(6)(B) (1988).
254 Caplan, 491 U.S. at 632-33.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 632-33 n.10 (quoting Brief for the ABA as Amicus Curiae at 17, Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (No. 87-1729)).
257 ABA Amicus Brief at 17-22, Caplin (No. 87-1729). Similar ethics arguments had
been rejected by a Court of Appeals judge in the case on ad hominem grounds; he saw a
constitutional attack on a statute which compels a contingency fee as an example of the
legal profession being "money grubbing." The judge fulminated that when the shoe is
on the other foot and contingent fees are attractive to the personal injury lawyer, the
lawyer will not take an hourly fee but will insist on a contingent fee to earn more money.
In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chtd., 837 F.2d 637, 650 (4th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (Murnaghan, J. concurring), aff'd, 491 U.S. 617 (1989). A dissenting
judge answered this diatribe by arguing that the civil analogy is so irrelevant "one won-
ders if the real thought is not that there are also bad lawyers to be taken into account in
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sought to minimize ethical concerns. It argued that the ethics prob-
lem was hypothetical and should not be decided; that the conflicts
argument regarding a possible plea bargain to preserve the fee had
been rejected;258 that there was no actual contingent fee in the case;
that there was no contingent fee issue peculiar to the forfeiture stat-
ute because in many cases if defendant is convicted he cannot work
to pay off the fee; that the prohibition on contingent fees rests in
large part on the public interest in avoiding temptation to corrup-
tion and not in protecting a defendant's interests; that contingent
fee problems do not raise constitutional issues; and, that Congress
could rationally conclude that a fee resembling a contingent fee is
better for the integrity of the criminal justice system than allowing
drug profits to pay fees.
259
Just as the Government's arguments were briefed mostly in
footnote,260 the Supreme Court dealt with the ethical concerns in a
footnote. The Court said that a mere reading of the indictment
would remove any chance that the attorney would not know the
source of his fee, so not being ignorant, he would have no incentive
not to investigate the case fully. 261 And plea bargaining against the
client's interest to preserve the fee would "surely constitute ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel" and the defendant would have a rem-
edy. 262 (This was surprising optimism from a Court which has made
it extremely difficult to vacate convictions on the ground of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel.263 )
Four dissenting justices in Caplin & Drysdale read the Court's
disposition of the cases as creating a contingent fee situation that
assessing the governmental interests at stake." 837 F.2d at 652 n.3 (Phillips, J.
dissenting).
258 Proceedings in Vindication of Civil Rights; Attorney's Fees, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1988), provides for awards of attorneys fees to a prevailing plaintiff. In Evans v.JeffD.,
475 U.S. 717 (1986), the Supreme Court had ruled that the statute did not prohibit
judicial approval of class action settlements that were conditional on plaintiff waiving his
claim for attorneys fees. The Court reasoned there was no ethical duty to seek such a
fee, and in this case plaintiff's counsel had recommended the settlement. Id. at 728. The
statute was interpreted to permit this kind of settlement despite the argument that offers
of settlements conditioned upon waiver of attorneys fees would exploit opposing coun-
sel's ethical obligations to his client. Id. The Court noted the attorney's general ethical
duty not to be swayed by his own interests. Id. at 728 n.14.
259 Brief for the Respondent at 40-4 1, Caplan & Drysdale, Chtd. v. United States, 491
U.S. 617 (1989) (No. 87-1729).
260 Id. at 41 n.21.
261 Caplin, 491 U.S. at 632 n.10.
262 Id. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. The Court said it had rejected a
"similar" claim in Evans v.JeffD., 475 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1986); See supra note 258.
263 See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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places the attorney in an ethical violation unless he has first received
payment from a supposedly untainted source.264 Even if the de-
fendant finds a lawyer "so foolish, ignorant, beholden or idealistic
as to take the business," the attorney's integrity would be questiona-
ble because of his willingness to violate ethical norms. 265 The dis-
sent seemed to believe that the attorney could remain ignorant of
the source of assets used to pay his fee, and thus avoid the contin-
gent fee prohibition, but that this, however, would lead to inade-
quate investigation of the case. 266
B. ETHICS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In Caplin & Drysdale, the Court found the relationship between
the alleged allowance of contingent fees and the constitutional issue
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel weak: "The fact that a
federal statutory scheme authorizing contingent fees-again, if that
is what Congress has created in § 853 (a premise we doubt)-is at
odds with model disciplinary rules or state disciplinary codes hardly
renders the federal statute invalid." 267 Here the Court was correct:
Congress can supersede state constitutions, and it can certainly su-
persede mere ABA model codes incorporated into state ethics regu-
lations, without running afoul of federal constitutional rights. 268
Ethical considerations might bear on the question of Congress's in-
tent in requiring forfeiture of attorney fees, but there was too little
legislative history for the Court to dwell upon that possibility.269
Having interpreted the forfeiture statute as reaching attorney's
fees, the Court upheld the statute against attack under the Sixth
Amendments provision establishing the right to counsel.270 The
Court did not discuss its precedents on the relationship of ethics to
the constitutional right to counsel. As with legislative history, ethics
rules are used by the Court when they support the Court's decision
and brushed aside when they do not.
271
264 491 U.S. at 649 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
265 Id. (quoting United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F.Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
266 Caplin, 491 U.S. at 650.
267 Id. at 633 n.10.
268 Id.
269 United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 608-10 & n.8 (1989).
270 Caplin, 491 U.S. at 632. The Court interpreted the statute in United States v. Mon-
santo, 491 U.S. 600, 611-14 (1989).
271 See, e.g., McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisc., 486 U.S. 429, 440 (1988) (rule re-
quiring withdrawing assigned appellate counsel to discuss why the issues lack merit car-
ries out the ethical obligation of candor); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160
(1988) (no constitutional right to have court approve client's waiver of multiple-repre-
sentation conflict; ethics rules impose limits on multiple representation. Id. at 162.);
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 777-78 (1987) (even if multiple representation gives rise
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Clearly the contingent fee ban did not present the Court with a
ground for decision, the validity of criminal contingent fee agree-
ments not being the issue. Counsel was trying to use the contin-
gency ethics tail to "wag" the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
"dog," an argument that had had some impact on lower courts will-
ing to view the statute or the Constitution favorably to the de-
fense.272 It would have lent unprecedented and surprising force to
to conflict of interest, no ineffective assistance of counsel based on analysis of lawyer's
conduct.); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174-75 (1986) (right to counsel does not
include right to cause the lawyer to violate ethics by allowing his client to commit per-
jury; four concurring justices disagree with the broad sweep of the majority opinion's
implied "adoption of a set of standards of professional responsibility for attorneys in
state criminal proceedings" by giving weight to the ABA amicus suggestion that the
MODEL RULES should govern the attorney's responsibilities. Id. at 189.); United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (defendant's summation invited prosecutor's response; de-
fendant was prohibited by ethics from interjecting his personal beliefs);Jones v. Barnes,
463 U.S. 745, 753 n.6 (1983) (no constitutional right to have assigned appellate counsel
raise non-frivolous issue on appeal; Court notes that even if ABA STANDARDS appear to
allow client to decide what non-frivolous issues are to be raised, "the fact the ABA may
have chosen to recognize a given practice as desirable or appropriate does not mean that
the practice is required by the Constitution." Id.); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
318-19 (1981) (ethics means that a public defender is a lawyer serving his client; he is
not acting under color of law for civil rights purposes.); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261,
269 n.15 (1981) (lawyer paid by third party; possible conflict so court should have in-
quired); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980) (trial court need not inquire
regarding conflict of interest from multiple representation unless an objection is made;
counsel has an ethical duty to advise the court of conflict.); Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S.
193, 200-01 n.17 (1979) (ethics means that assigned counsel is not immune from a state
law malpractice suit); Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466-67 n.16 (1975) (lawyer must
not favor his own interests, so no contempt for his advice to invoke privilege); Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 n.7 (1964) (prohibiting interrogated suspect from commu-
nicating with his retained attorney violated his consitutional rights; canon prohibiting
communicating with party represented by attorney cited). Cf. United States v. Henry,
447 U.S. 264, 275 n.14 (1980) (government communication with defendant is jail cell via
informant violates right to counsel; Court cites but eschews reliance on ethical prohibi-
tion of communicating with party known to be represented by counsel); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (seminal case on right to counsel and multiple-repre-
sentation conflict; ethics not averted to).
272 United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United
States v. lanniello, 644 F.Supp. 452, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (forfeiture of attorneys fees
violates 6th Amendment; inter alia, defense counsel might be considered as having ac-
cepted a forbidden contingent fee, citing MODEL CODE, supra note 4, at DR 2-106(c) n.3
(on corrupting justice); attorney might want to plea bargain to avoid forfeiture instead
of acting in client's best interest, or go to trial to get a favorable verdict, citing MODEL
CODE, supra note 4, at DR 5-103(A) (on advising to client's benefit)). See United States v.
Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 921 (4th Cir. 1986) (counsel might not investigate filly in order
to remain ignorant of source of assets to pay fee, or plea bargain to retain fee), rev'd sub
nom., In re Forfeiture Hearing, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nora.,
Caplin & Drysdale, Chtd. v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United States v. Bassett,
632 F.Supp. 1308, 1316 n.5 (D. Md. 1986) (counsel argues that if he agrees to represent
defendant without an order exempting his fee from forfeiture, he is violating contingent
fee ban; motion was granted).
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ethics rules to hold that the rules invalidated a statute, or even that
they compelled an interpretation of the statute against its plain
meaning.2
73
C. FORMAL VS. PRACTICAL CONTINGENCY AND THE FUTURE OF
CONTINGENT FEES
In its contingent fee footnote, the Court accepted the Govern-
ment's position that there was no contingent fee agreement in the
case:
There is no indication here that petitioner, or any other firm, has actu-
ally sought to charge a defendant on a contingent basis; rather the
claim is that a law firm's prospect of collecting its fee may turn on the
outcome at trial. This, however, may often be the case in criminal de-
fense work.2 7
4
The implication was that, unless the agreement explicitly made the
client liable only in the event of acquittal, it did not create a contin-
gent fee even though receiving the money was for all practical pur-
poses contingent on the outcome of the case.
The Court's fixation on the terms of the agreement is oddly
wooden. If the lawyer and client believe that there will be no pay-
ment absent acquittal, it is hard to see why the absence of contrac-
tual liability conditioned on acquittal is material. For instance,
suppose that in a personal injury case the agreement provided that
the client would pay $25,000 as a fee, but both parties to the agree-
ment knew that the client did not have the funds, and that the fee
would be paid only in case of a substantial recovery. In terms of the
policy issues revolving around contingent fees this does not seem
any less of a contingent fee contract than an agreement explicitly
providing that the fee will be paid only in the event of the recovery.
If the attorney and client do not care as much about the contract as
they do about the practical reality, then the Court should not govern
their conduct on any basis other than that reality. The Court may
have been correct in the trivial sense that the parties to the case
before it did not know that the statute would be held to encompass
the fee and therefore there was no expectation of contingency, but
certainly lawyers and clients would expect contigency from the date
of the 1989 decision.275
273 See supra note 271.
274 Caplin, 461 U.S. at 633 n.10.
275 There are apparently no reported cases that have passed upon agreements that
did make the client's liability for the fee only practically contingent, as distinguished
from practically and contractually contingent. But Cf Chicago Bar Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility Op. 84-9 (1985), reported in NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL
ETHICS AND RESPONSBiLrry IL:Opinions: 25 (1985) (fee for criminal case contingent on
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D. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF CONTINGENT FEES
After Caplin & Thsdale, functional criminal contingent fees, at
least in federal forfeiture cases, are now probably lawful. A contract
that explicitly creates a contingent fee may not be any more valid
after the Court's decision than before, but arrangements under
which the parties understand that the lawyer will not be paid unless
he or she obtains a release of the client's funds might be enforced by
state courts out of respect for the Supreme Court's decision. Alter-
natively, state courts might enforce such a rule because there is now
a class of cases where clients would have almost no other chance of
retaining private counsel, and the policy of making legal representa-
tion available might be seen as paramount. The agreement to pay
may be unconditional, but the contingency is built in by the sur-
rounding circumstances, i.e., the reasonable possibility that the
Government will seek forfeiture of the assets that must be used to
pay the attorney in the case. To insure payment, the assets injeop-
ardy might be assigned to the lawyer or otherwise secured for re-
lease in the event of acquittal.
The Supreme Court's ruling might give impetus to state courts
to overrule their case law making contingent fee contracts unen-
forceable even in nonforfeiture cases and even when formally con-
tingent. There is also the possibility that judges applying state
contract law will not find the Supreme Court's holding in the forfei-
ture cases binding or persuasive, because the cases applied federal
law that did not regulate contingent fee agreements, and because
state judges do not think the Supreme Court was really concerned
with contingent fee policies so much as it was trying to dispose of a
pesky issue. Finally, state court recalcitrance in enforcing contin-
gent fee agreements could cause federal courts to supersede state
contract law with a federal common law in aid of the federal criminal
justice system upholding contingent fee agreements made in forfei-
ture cases.
Given the precise black-letter prohibition in the codes, explicit
contingent fees even in forfeiture cases remain unarguably unethi-
cal, unless the Supreme Court's decision is interpreted as federal
pre-emption of state ethics rules.
Up to this point, there has been no conflict between the ethical
contingent fee prohibition and an attorney's "obligation" to make
private defense services available to forfeiture defendants, because
winning civil rights suit arising out of the arrest is ethical; no contingency in criminal
case; opinion overlooks possible conflict: attorney must go for acquittal in criminal case
because lesser offense conviction would legally and practically kill the civil rights case.).
1991] 545
LUSHING
there is no such obligation to them or to any other accused, despite
hortatory language. 276 Removal of the ethics ban on criminal con-
tingent fees will give that hortatory language some teeth, or at least
a tooth.
VII. CONCLUSION
The prohibition on criminal contingent fees springs from irrel-
evant conceptual thinking, unverified concerns regarding conflict of
interest, and prejudice against criminal attorneys and what they do.
These concerns do not provide sufficient reason to bar lawyers and
clients from entering into beneficial agreements. Repeal of the ban
on criminal contingent fees would be of particular benefit to the
middle class, who will be eager to pay for results instead of services.
Data could then be obtained on whether there actually are problems
such as conflict of interest. After all, repeal does not preclude regu-
lation or supervision, and certainly does not preclude reinstatement
of the ban in the event empirical evidence points out insurmounta-
ble problems. Either way, the Supreme Court's decision creating de
facto contingent fee cases presents an ideal opportunity to repeal
the ban and see what happens.
276 Such as "[a] basic tenet of the professional responsibility of lawyers is that every
person in our society should have ready access to the independent professional services
of a lawyer of integrity and competence." MODEL CODE, supra note 4, at EC 1-1.
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